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(elevator opening)
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♪ (music) ♪
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(ads popping sound)
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(storm approaching)
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(scratching)
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♪ (music) ♪
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(narrator) Just about every time
we use the Internet,
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a communication link,
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or an app,
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we agree to some very long
terms and conditions
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but, what exactly are we agreeing to?
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You guys, you gotta help me!
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These geeks in their casual jeans
they're trying to kidnap me!
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What?!
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It's crazy dude! They're saying it
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because I've agreed to their latest
terms and conditions on iTunes!
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Why? What the terms and conditions
for the last update say?
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I don't know, I didn't read them!
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You didn't read them?!
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Who the hell reads the entire thing
every time it pops up?!
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I do.
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Can you tell... can Apple tell
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how many people actually read it?
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- Well, they have to say that they agree--
- Right
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We can't know for sure if they read.
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We try to make it
in plain English and very short.
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If I were trying to make
a user agreement uninviting
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I would choose a small font,
a sensor font,
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- and I would set it in all caps--
- OK.
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Because what happens then,
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is that your have a type
that becomes a texture,
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rather than words and spaces.
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No one -- (laughter)
has read the terms and conditions!
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No one in the world!
(laughter) -- No one!
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Even the lawyers who wrote it,
wrote it like this! (laughter)
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You come to a website
and they have a set of rules
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usually described in the terms of service,
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and then you have a privacy policy,
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and as soon as
you start using the service,
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in essence you have agreed to their
terms of service and their privacy policy.
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(interviewer)"Do these terms
and conditions that we sign up for...
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"...even apply?"
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They do. I think if they didn't apply,
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I think the web will topple over.
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And so, to the extent
there have been contract decisions,
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and they held that these
terms and conditions are valid.
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(narrator) And this concept
is pretty new... for instance,
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you never had to sign an user's agreement
for an old fashion landline,
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or to watch TV,
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or to read a book.
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But if you use a smart phone,
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a Kindle,
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or you watch Hulu,
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then you do.
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Violet, baby, don't you sign anything!
What's this all about?
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A standard form of contract.
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Don't talk to me about contracts, Wonka,
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I use them myself,
they're strictly for suckers.
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Yes, but you wouldn't begrudge me
a little protection.
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(narrator) In fact, if you were
to read everything you agree to,
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it would take one full month of work
out of every year.
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That's 180 hours
you would need to spend
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every year.
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And according
to the Wall Street Journal,
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consumers lose
250 billion dollars each year
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due to what's hidden in fine print.
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Here's an example from LinkedIn's terms:
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You grant LinkedIn a non-exclusive,
irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual,
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unlimited, assignable, sublicenseable,
fully paid up and royalty-free right to us
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to copy, prepare derivative works of,
improve, distribute, publish, retain...
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(talking faster and faster)
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So, LinkedIn takes
pretty much everything forever.
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You find this kind of language
in Google, Pinterest, Facebook...
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pretty much anything
that people consider free.
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Instagram is finding
that pictures are worth much more
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than a thousand angry words,
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after the company updated
their user agreement to say
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it would have the right to sell
posted photos without compensation
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for use in advertising.
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(narrator) And, even if you are paying,
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companies have the ability
to make you accept
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just about whatever they please.
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In 2009, Game Station,
a company in the UK,
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put some pretty sneaky stuff
in their terms.
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They didn't take money,
or your first-born child,
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but for one day, their terms stated:
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"By placing an order via this website,
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you agree to grant us
a non-transferable option to claim,
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now and for ever more,
your immortal soul."
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The contract was only alive for a day
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but Game Station happen to rake in
the lives of 7,000 immortal souls.
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This was, of course, a joke,
however, it makes you wonder,
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what if there were
more serious consequences
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that might result from not reading
terms and conditions?
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And what if your phone came
with these long terms & conditions saying
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if you use the phone the government
can wiretap you? That would be insane.
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But that's the kind of world
we're living in.
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(narrator) The world where
the government can wiretap you
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because of terms and conditions?
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If you look at the iPhone User Agreement
wiretapping isn't mentioned,
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but in AT&T's Privacy Policy,
they say that they can use data
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to "investigate, prevent or take action
regarding illegal activities..."
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Prevent?
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♪ Love the stuff we're made of Pizza Hut ♪
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(narrator) In 1994, Pizza Hut
became the first major chain
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to accept a delivery online.
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Suddenly, the Internet
needed a way to remember
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who you were, where you lived,
and how you were going to pay.
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My question is, what the hell?!
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Like, how do they know who you are?
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Yeah.
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Ok... there are
these things called cookies,
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where, like, if you go to a site
and buy something,
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it'll remember you and then create ads
for other stuff you might want to buy.
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So, it learns information about me?
Seems like an invasion of privacy.
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(narrator) It wasn't until the late 90s
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that companies began voluntarily
adding privacy policies
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to explain what was happening
with this data.
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Then, in 2000, an online company
called Toysmart went bankrupt,
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but they had an idea:
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they tried to sell their database
of 195,000 users to another company.
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This includes names, billing information,
shopping preferences and family profiles,
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even though their privacy policy said
they would never share information.
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People felt like they were being duped.
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Lawmakers tell you,
time and time again,
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that every time
they go back to their districts
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people are telling them that
they want some internet privacy laws,
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they want some protection.
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[narrator] In early 2001
over a dozen bills
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were introduced in Congress
to protect privacy online.
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(Bush)These acts of mass murder
were intended to frighten our nation
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into chaos and retreat,
But they have failed.
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(narrator) All of the privacy legislation
was killed or abandoned,
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and the Patriot Act was,
of course, initiated.
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(Bush) The Bill before me takes account
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of the new realities and dangers
posed by modern terrorists.
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This new law that I sign today
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will allow surveillance
of all communications used by terrorists,
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including e-mails,
the Internet, and cell phones.
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The Patriot Act expanded the ability
of the Federal Government
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to do surveillance
in a lot of little ways.
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You don't need
a judges' approval, for instance,
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to find out what websites
someone visited,
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what search terms
they typed into Google.
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The question of your... if you will,
information being retained by Google,
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is not really at this point
a Google decision,
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it's really a political
or public policy decision
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enforced by different governments
in different ways.
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(narrator) What if privacy policies
weren't about protecting privacy at all
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but rather, taking it away?
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Let's take a look at Google's
Privacy Policy around this time
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to see if any changes were made.
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So, here's Google's Privacy Policy
from December of 2000:
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"Google may also choose to use cookies
to store user preferences.
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A cookie can tell us,
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'This is the same computer
that visited Google two days ago',
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but it cannot tell us,
'This person is Joe Smith',
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or even, 'This person lives
in the United States'."
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And here is the Privacy Policy
from one year later, in December of 2001:
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"Google does this by storing
user preferences and cookies,
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and by tracking user trends
and patterns of how people search.
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Google will not disclose
cookies to third parties,
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except as required
by a valid legal process,
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such as a search warrant, subpoena,
statute or court order."
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Now, it's important to know
the fundamental difference
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between these two policies.
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One says that you're totally anonymous,
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the other says,
when necessary, you're not.
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But here's what's strange:
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So, the first screen shot you saw
of Google's oldest policy
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was taken by a non-profit
Internet archival service
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that records what websites
used to look like by taking snapshots,
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and it's been doing it since the 90s.
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Now, Google also lists the history
of its privacy policies
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on its own official archive page.
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In their archive, they said they got
every privacy policy
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that goes back to the beginning,
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but what Google shows
as their original privacy policies,
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doesn't match that
of the archive service.
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Instead, they show their policy
from December of 2001,
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the one that says
that users are not anonymous.
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Google claims this is their first
privacy policy, which it isn't.
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So, why would Google not include
its original privacy policy
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on its own archives page?
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The one that said
you would remain anonymous.
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What if the data collection
that the Patriot Act required
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became the foundation
of a whole new business model,
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and the foundation
of the modern Internet as we know it?
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Would that be something
worth covering up?
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Well, even though we don't
write checks to Google,
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and that's one of the reasons
we kind of like the company,
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it doesn't mean
that Google is really free,
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or that we are free
in the liberty sense when we use it.
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It might feel different if Google
was effectively a $500 a year service,
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because that's the amount of...
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that's the value of the data
that you're providing.
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I mean, that was a really critical find
in that advertising could be targeted
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based on information that people
were somehow supplying about themselves.
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Suddenly, you didn't have to wonder,
"Was somebody watching my commercial?"
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You knew if someone click on my ad
that meant that they paid attention to it.
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(narrator) In 2012, Google was one
of the most valuable stocks in the world,
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and Mark Zuckerberg,
the founder of Facebook,
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had become one
of the richest men in America.
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My job is to help investors figure out
for themselves what this thing's worth.
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I look at what Facebook has as an asset,
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which is 900 million people,
and a ton of data on those people.
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And I say, if they use 10% of that data
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they're gonna be
the most valuable company ever.
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(narrator) When personal data
is worth this much,
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why would Google,
or any free internet service,
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be opposed to the data retention
that the Patriot Act required.
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Anonymity wasn't profitable.
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The people say, who are willing to...
give up a little bit of information
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in exchange for having access
to something that's free,
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or something that's fun,
or a free taco. (laughter)
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I don't think that ever changes, right?
You always want something free,
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and plenty of people are willing
to provide information to get that.
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(narrator) And plenty of companies
picked up on this fact.
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Let me give you some
very practical tips (laughter)
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First of all, I want everyone here
to be careful about
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what you post of Facebook.
(laughter)
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What the default settings
are on Facebook...
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this is how most people
use this technology.
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When these companies are building
these systems they know that.
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00:14:20,792 --> 00:14:26,027
(interviewer) "So, why is it the default
for everything sharing, every photo,
242
00:14:26,067 --> 00:14:27,913
when I start Facebook?
243
00:14:27,963 --> 00:14:30,198
Why isn't it just for my friends?
244
00:14:30,258 --> 00:14:32,159
Why is the default for everybody?
245
00:14:32,209 --> 00:14:34,211
Because it's really confusing
for my mom to figure out
246
00:14:34,241 --> 00:14:36,234
how to just share to her friends."
247
00:14:36,304 --> 00:14:39,430
The way we've designed the site
is that is a community thing,
248
00:14:39,470 --> 00:14:42,112
where some people want to share
with just their friends,
249
00:14:42,152 --> 00:14:43,770
but a lot of people also want to share
250
00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:46,127
- with the community now--
- Right, right.
251
00:14:46,167 --> 00:14:48,482
I want to share with everyone
who works with me at Facebook,
252
00:14:48,522 --> 00:14:50,531
I want to share with everyone
who went to my college,
253
00:14:50,581 --> 00:14:53,168
everyone in the village around me.
254
00:14:53,248 --> 00:14:55,214
And those people aren't just my friends.
255
00:14:55,274 --> 00:14:57,886
(narrator) Even Mark's explanation
doesn't make any sense.
256
00:14:57,947 --> 00:14:59,730
He says he wants
to share with the school,
257
00:14:59,770 --> 00:15:01,199
with the quaint village next to him,
258
00:15:01,249 --> 00:15:03,641
he doesn't say he want
to share with the entire world
259
00:15:03,671 --> 00:15:05,878
and yet, that's the default.
260
00:15:06,125 --> 00:15:08,666
The challenge with default
is that you get comfortable
261
00:15:08,706 --> 00:15:10,793
with whatever the default is.
262
00:15:10,924 --> 00:15:12,908
When the default is public,
263
00:15:12,949 --> 00:15:15,680
you're actually going to adapt
really beautifully and deal with it.
264
00:15:15,730 --> 00:15:17,647
When the default is private,
265
00:15:17,697 --> 00:15:19,862
you can adapt comfortably
and deal with it.
266
00:15:20,152 --> 00:15:23,301
When the defaults change,
that's when problems emerge.
267
00:15:23,740 --> 00:15:26,112
(narrator) And in fact,
that's what Facebook did.
268
00:15:26,152 --> 00:15:30,304
In 2009, Facebook made changes to their
privacy policy without telling anyone.
269
00:15:30,751 --> 00:15:33,587
- Doing a privacy change for 350 million users--
- Yeah--
270
00:15:33,687 --> 00:15:37,200
it's a really, you know, it's, it's...
not the type of thing
271
00:15:37,290 --> 00:15:39,147
that a lot of companies would do,
you know...
272
00:15:39,207 --> 00:15:41,146
We've decided that these
would be the social norms now,
273
00:15:41,186 --> 00:15:43,103
and we just went for it.
274
00:15:43,273 --> 00:15:45,596
(narrator) You might remember
the fan page with over a million people
275
00:15:45,636 --> 00:15:47,658
who tried to get the policy reversed.
276
00:15:47,688 --> 00:15:49,651
What was the big deal, you might ask...?
277
00:15:49,701 --> 00:15:51,539
Well, over the course of a night
278
00:15:51,599 --> 00:15:53,812
Facebook turned
what was once private information
279
00:15:54,022 --> 00:15:56,375
into totally public information.
280
00:16:02,495 --> 00:16:06,489
These platforms have an incentive
to keep as much information about you
281
00:16:06,639 --> 00:16:09,190
and make it as visible as possible.
282
00:16:12,451 --> 00:16:16,781
It's almost the question then becomes
what's the less forgivable sin,
283
00:16:17,181 --> 00:16:19,470
having this crazy one night stand,
284
00:16:19,590 --> 00:16:22,001
or not knowing
how to use Facebook properly.
285
00:16:33,128 --> 00:16:35,506
Most relationships in your life,
286
00:16:35,576 --> 00:16:39,658
it's very good that the other person
doesn't know everything
287
00:16:39,718 --> 00:16:45,126
you've ever said,
or scribbled, or thought.
288
00:16:52,526 --> 00:16:55,267
When you choose to share a photo album
289
00:16:55,317 --> 00:16:58,761
you go to Facebook and you choose
to put those photos there.
290
00:17:02,481 --> 00:17:05,256
How do I opt in on every single thing?
291
00:17:05,526 --> 00:17:06,939
Opt in.
292
00:17:08,595 --> 00:17:10,000
Opt in.
293
00:17:10,892 --> 00:17:12,131
Opt in.
294
00:17:16,238 --> 00:17:18,967
I'm OK with Facebook
behaving like a company,
295
00:17:19,067 --> 00:17:22,396
but I think we need
to treat it like a company
296
00:17:22,536 --> 00:17:25,475
and not treat it
like some benign public utility.
297
00:17:26,622 --> 00:17:29,215
[narrator] These are the default settings
on Facebook in 2005
298
00:17:29,265 --> 00:17:31,275
divided into 12 categories.
299
00:17:31,425 --> 00:17:34,565
As time passes, more and more
information is shared by default.
300
00:17:34,645 --> 00:17:38,053
In 2009, Facebook began automatically
sharing personal information
301
00:17:38,124 --> 00:17:39,976
with the entire Internet.
302
00:17:40,066 --> 00:17:42,649
By 2010, everything
was shared by default,
303
00:17:42,689 --> 00:17:45,122
except for your contact info
and your birthday.
304
00:17:45,216 --> 00:17:50,383
We could if you did a search in Gmail,
in YouTube, and so forth, yesterday,
305
00:17:50,823 --> 00:17:53,563
and you did it from your home...
I'll give you the worst case:
306
00:17:53,603 --> 00:17:56,216
You did it from your home and you
only have one computer in your home.
307
00:17:56,566 --> 00:18:00,181
In theory, we can cross-correlate those
and get all three together.
308
00:18:00,931 --> 00:18:03,341
But we don't do that
and we're not likely to do that.
309
00:18:03,649 --> 00:18:07,355
(narrator) But in January 2012, Google
made changes to their privacy policy
310
00:18:07,405 --> 00:18:09,262
and they did just that.
311
00:18:09,302 --> 00:18:11,708
Google combined all of the information
312
00:18:11,738 --> 00:18:14,220
any of their services
have collected about a person,
313
00:18:14,290 --> 00:18:17,117
and put it into one single profile.
314
00:18:17,157 --> 00:18:20,112
What Eric Schmidt had said
was the worst case scenario,
315
00:18:20,252 --> 00:18:22,469
Google had actually done.
316
00:18:29,740 --> 00:18:33,540
How can you honestly sit here
and tell this committee
317
00:18:33,650 --> 00:18:36,147
this is not a growing problem?
318
00:18:36,557 --> 00:18:38,438
A good deal
of what I was trying to say
319
00:18:38,468 --> 00:18:42,247
is that I don't think there is evidence
of a market failure or consumer harm
320
00:18:42,497 --> 00:18:49,141
from the legal and legitimate use
of personal information in commerce.
321
00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:52,896
I don't think there's evidence of it.
322
00:18:53,327 --> 00:18:55,724
There are companies
that we've never heard of like Acxiom,
323
00:18:55,994 --> 00:18:59,495
that claims to have about 1,500 points
of data on the average American citizen,
324
00:18:59,595 --> 00:19:02,888
everything from, whether you're
right-handed or left-handed,
325
00:19:02,958 --> 00:19:04,921
what kind of dog you have,
326
00:19:04,961 --> 00:19:06,963
what your sort
of psychological outlook is,
327
00:19:06,983 --> 00:19:10,031
and all of that can be used
to inform decisions
328
00:19:10,071 --> 00:19:12,864
that businesses make about us as well.
329
00:19:13,048 --> 00:19:16,551
These are the types of companies
that a potential employer would go to
330
00:19:16,601 --> 00:19:19,723
to try to run a background check
on somebody before they hire them.
331
00:19:19,813 --> 00:19:24,072
They're able to connect the fact
that you went to site A,
332
00:19:24,102 --> 00:19:27,136
and then later B,
and eventually to site C,
333
00:19:27,207 --> 00:19:30,422
and create this detailed history
of what sites you visit online.
334
00:19:31,037 --> 00:19:33,114
They don't put your name
in the cookie,
335
00:19:33,285 --> 00:19:35,236
they put a unique serial number
in the cookie,
336
00:19:35,276 --> 00:19:38,064
that could then be linked
to your name in their database.
337
00:19:38,512 --> 00:19:41,314
I don't know
if you've ever seen the picture
338
00:19:41,374 --> 00:19:44,517
of the ad network ecosystem
that shows all the parties
339
00:19:44,577 --> 00:19:48,734
in the ad network ecosystem;
it's a bit overwhelming.
340
00:19:49,544 --> 00:19:52,079
The information is valuable
to different people for different reasons.
341
00:19:52,670 --> 00:19:55,182
What if you buy a lot of alcohol?
342
00:19:55,223 --> 00:19:56,979
Well, they might want
to raise your premiums
343
00:19:57,038 --> 00:19:59,971
because they think you are at risk
for alcoholism, or something like that.
344
00:20:00,020 --> 00:20:04,844
The company might use it
in a way that actually harms you.
345
00:20:05,106 --> 00:20:07,912
(narrator) For example,
in 2008 thousands of people
346
00:20:07,952 --> 00:20:10,038
suddenly had their credit limits reduced,
347
00:20:10,078 --> 00:20:11,939
seemingly for no reason.
348
00:20:11,979 --> 00:20:14,219
While on vacation,
one wealthy business owner from Atlanta,
349
00:20:14,339 --> 00:20:17,878
saw his limit plummet
from $10,800 to just $3,800
350
00:20:17,898 --> 00:20:19,946
ruining his vacation.
351
00:20:20,015 --> 00:20:22,075
The letter he received said this:
352
00:20:22,135 --> 00:20:24,198
"Other customers who've used
their card at establishments
353
00:20:24,239 --> 00:20:26,292
where you recently shopped
354
00:20:26,342 --> 00:20:28,407
had a poor repayment history
with American Express."
355
00:20:28,447 --> 00:20:30,863
This means companies like Wal-Mart.
356
00:20:30,923 --> 00:20:32,530
And in Minneapolis,
357
00:20:32,570 --> 00:20:34,449
a father came into a Target outraged
358
00:20:34,469 --> 00:20:37,161
that they were sending
his teenage daughter pregnancy coupons,
359
00:20:37,191 --> 00:20:39,605
coupons that were addressed to her.
360
00:20:39,655 --> 00:20:43,136
The man thought that Target was trying
to encourage his daughter to get pregnant.
361
00:20:43,176 --> 00:20:46,179
As it turned out,
thanks to her shopping habits,
362
00:20:46,310 --> 00:20:50,081
Target knew that this high-schooler
was pregnant before her own father did.
363
00:20:50,642 --> 00:20:53,137
The father later apologized.
364
00:20:53,615 --> 00:20:55,912
And in The Netherlands,
data were being used to harm customers
365
00:20:55,952 --> 00:20:57,718
in a whole new way.
366
00:20:57,818 --> 00:21:00,093
Now, while you're driving
and using a GPS,
367
00:21:00,143 --> 00:21:03,191
that GPS is sending back signals
that tell how fast you're moving.
368
00:21:03,262 --> 00:21:06,078
It's really useful
for helping us to avoid traffic,
369
00:21:06,108 --> 00:21:08,754
but that kind of little company
called Tom Tom was wondering
370
00:21:08,874 --> 00:21:11,479
who else might be interested
in knowing the speed of traffic.
371
00:21:11,539 --> 00:21:12,958
And so, in The Netherlands,
372
00:21:12,978 --> 00:21:14,397
the data that people
were willingly trading
373
00:21:14,437 --> 00:21:16,085
to find a faster way home,
374
00:21:16,135 --> 00:21:18,885
was being sold to the authorities
to give those same drivers tickets.
375
00:21:26,571 --> 00:21:30,295
Is the reason we don't have
any baseline consumer privacy law
376
00:21:30,625 --> 00:21:32,608
because of the FBI? No.
377
00:21:33,147 --> 00:21:35,438
That is largely due
to lobbying by companies
378
00:21:35,658 --> 00:21:38,253
that have built extremely
lucrative businesses
379
00:21:38,334 --> 00:21:40,610
around these business activities,
380
00:21:40,700 --> 00:21:43,107
and don't want to do anything
to disrupt that.
381
00:21:44,103 --> 00:21:49,186
Under Facebook's terms and conditions
a user must be 13 or older.
382
00:21:49,747 --> 00:21:53,890
Despite this, according
to recent consumers' report study,
383
00:21:53,970 --> 00:21:57,658
an estimated 7.5 million users
were younger than 13.
384
00:21:58,333 --> 00:22:02,548
First of all, we don't allow people
to have an account under the age of 13.
385
00:22:02,918 --> 00:22:05,672
And my reaction to that is that
that's just absolutely indefensible,
386
00:22:05,732 --> 00:22:08,275
it's unbelievable that you would say that.
387
00:22:08,853 --> 00:22:11,649
Senator, I just want to say we really
emphatically agree with your points.
388
00:22:11,957 --> 00:22:14,587
They say that Facebook
sent an army of lawyers
389
00:22:14,647 --> 00:22:18,582
so that the final privacy legislation
that emerged in 2011
390
00:22:18,842 --> 00:22:20,800
was watered down significantly
391
00:22:20,850 --> 00:22:23,214
in a way that wouldn't affect
Facebook business model.
392
00:22:23,710 --> 00:22:26,463
My name is Alan Davidson
and I'm the Director of Public Policy
393
00:22:26,533 --> 00:22:28,735
for Google in North and South America.
394
00:22:28,935 --> 00:22:30,819
My message today is simple:
395
00:22:30,959 --> 00:22:34,911
As we've heard, mobile services create
enormous social and economic benefits.
396
00:22:35,326 --> 00:22:38,043
I reject the notion
that privacy protection
397
00:22:38,093 --> 00:22:40,651
is the enemy of innovation.
398
00:22:40,861 --> 00:22:43,629
It absolutely
doesn't have to be, and isn't.
399
00:22:44,167 --> 00:22:46,971
(narrator) It was an expensive year
of lobbying for these big companies.
400
00:22:47,110 --> 00:22:49,679
Google spent five times
as much as the year before.
401
00:22:49,979 --> 00:22:52,000
And Facebook spent
four times as much.
402
00:22:52,472 --> 00:22:56,921
The Senate Bill 242 will protect
users of social networking Internet sites.
403
00:22:57,220 --> 00:23:02,534
It will protect these users
from identity theft and unwanted contact
404
00:23:02,624 --> 00:23:05,310
by keeping
their private information private,
405
00:23:05,380 --> 00:23:08,035
of course, unless they agree to share it.
406
00:23:08,313 --> 00:23:10,797
I know that many members,
including myself,
407
00:23:10,867 --> 00:23:14,463
do not want to negatively impact
a very important industry
408
00:23:14,533 --> 00:23:16,737
for the State of California.
409
00:23:16,937 --> 00:23:19,572
Individuals involved in this industry
don't want to see
410
00:23:19,612 --> 00:23:22,186
any regulation whatsoever,
411
00:23:22,286 --> 00:23:24,514
so I think that's really the key.
412
00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:28,227
And one of the most interesting things
I've found in these conversations
413
00:23:28,357 --> 00:23:34,338
is that many members of the legislature
don't even have social network sites
414
00:23:34,408 --> 00:23:37,261
because they're concerned about
about their privacy.
415
00:23:37,465 --> 00:23:39,634
At the time the Bill was being heard,
416
00:23:39,674 --> 00:23:41,822
all the lobbyist
were in the committee room
417
00:23:41,892 --> 00:23:43,900
for the entire hearing.
418
00:23:44,109 --> 00:23:46,248
They did not come forward to speak.
419
00:23:46,328 --> 00:23:48,695
So, sort of an interesting process,
420
00:23:48,755 --> 00:23:50,981
sort of a stealth killing of the Bill,
421
00:23:51,350 --> 00:23:55,412
without the opportunity for the public
to really see who was in opposition.
422
00:23:55,753 --> 00:23:58,503
So, people like Google and Facebook
were in strong opposition
423
00:23:59,122 --> 00:24:01,094
Facebook in particular.
424
00:24:01,610 --> 00:24:03,336
(interviewer)
"What did Facebook have to lose?"
425
00:24:03,977 --> 00:24:09,420
You know, I really
do not understand their logic,
426
00:24:09,531 --> 00:24:11,938
and you'd have to ask them about that,
427
00:24:12,007 --> 00:24:16,161
- but when I analyze an issue like this --
- I'd love to ask them about that,
428
00:24:16,241 --> 00:24:18,106
they won't talk to me, so...
429
00:24:18,166 --> 00:24:20,360
I'm not surprised. (laughter)
430
00:24:20,678 --> 00:24:24,203
I don't think the rules
of law and regulation
431
00:24:24,293 --> 00:24:29,137
necessarily apply when it comes to,
you know, interacting with a company
432
00:24:29,247 --> 00:24:31,574
that wants to sell you something.
433
00:24:31,898 --> 00:24:34,336
Yeah. We should be worried.
434
00:24:35,507 --> 00:24:37,939
(narrator) But worried... about what?
435
00:24:38,328 --> 00:24:41,455
Sure the data collection allowed
by privacy policies has fooled Congress
436
00:24:41,576 --> 00:24:44,820
But was there something
more serious we were agreeing to?
437
00:24:55,717 --> 00:24:58,566
(narrator) Total Information Awareness.
438
00:24:58,776 --> 00:25:02,124
A program initiated by the government
in January of 2002.
439
00:25:02,645 --> 00:25:06,693
Its mission: to collect
every digital transmission imaginable.
440
00:25:07,142 --> 00:25:09,838
And yes, this was their real symbol,
441
00:25:09,918 --> 00:25:12,774
the eye on the pyramid scanning the Earth
with the laser beam.
442
00:25:13,373 --> 00:25:16,280
It actually looks oddly similar to
what's inside Mark Zuckerberg's hoodie.
443
00:25:16,433 --> 00:25:18,291
(Zuckerberg) Making the world
more openly connected.
444
00:25:18,415 --> 00:25:21,729
Oh, my God! It's like
a secret cult. (laughter)
445
00:25:22,159 --> 00:25:25,856
Total Information Awareness was
a program designed to connect the dots,
446
00:25:25,926 --> 00:25:31,501
to link banking activities
to flight searches, to online activities--
447
00:25:31,949 --> 00:25:37,075
(TV) But the Pentagon is clearly moving
to create the largest electronic eye ever
448
00:25:37,295 --> 00:25:39,723
to look at any and all Americans.
449
00:25:40,092 --> 00:25:43,976
You're looking for trends
and transactions that are associated
450
00:25:44,085 --> 00:25:47,100
with some potential terrorist act.
451
00:25:47,393 --> 00:25:51,667
They believe that with enough data
they can predict who would be engaging
452
00:25:51,797 --> 00:25:53,907
in nefarious crimes.
453
00:25:54,001 --> 00:25:56,452
(narrator) The public was outraged,
Congress was outraged,
454
00:25:56,552 --> 00:25:58,424
the program was shut down.
455
00:25:58,579 --> 00:26:00,933
The lesson that the government learned
456
00:26:00,983 --> 00:26:03,727
after the failure
of the Total Information Awareness,
457
00:26:03,767 --> 00:26:07,619
was that if you're going to create
a gigantic spying program,
458
00:26:08,128 --> 00:26:09,848
don't give it a creepy name.
459
00:26:10,024 --> 00:26:13,407
There's nothing to prevent them
from developing the same capabilities
460
00:26:13,688 --> 00:26:16,298
just in smarter ways
from their standpoint.
461
00:26:22,204 --> 00:26:27,500
A wiretap requires a court order,
nothing has changed, by the way.
462
00:26:28,033 --> 00:26:30,904
(narrator) But, in reality,
lots had changed.
463
00:26:31,227 --> 00:26:33,969
How we were told one day in late 2002,
464
00:26:34,058 --> 00:26:37,731
that an NSA representative
was coming to the office...
465
00:26:38,217 --> 00:26:41,395
Mark Klein came to us,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
466
00:26:41,525 --> 00:26:47,018
with data and documents that show
that AT&T was engaged
467
00:26:47,188 --> 00:26:49,310
in a wiretapping program.
468
00:26:49,434 --> 00:26:52,433
The NSA is much different from the CIA.
469
00:26:52,583 --> 00:26:56,433
First of all, it's about three times
the size, it costs far more,
470
00:26:58,724 --> 00:27:02,178
it's tremendously
more secret than the CIA,
471
00:27:02,378 --> 00:27:05,092
and what it does, it's very different.
472
00:27:05,202 --> 00:27:10,026
It's focused on eavesdropping,
on tapping into major communication links.
473
00:27:10,626 --> 00:27:13,314
It actually had a secret room
in their facilities,
474
00:27:13,374 --> 00:27:15,760
and they were creating a copy
of Internet traffic
475
00:27:15,860 --> 00:27:17,795
and sending it to the NSA.
476
00:27:18,344 --> 00:27:20,831
So, in a sense, they're
vacuuming up, scooping up...
477
00:27:21,061 --> 00:27:25,559
Everything is blatantly vacuuming up,
everything's going across those links.
478
00:27:25,645 --> 00:27:27,864
- And you're certain of that?
- I'm certain of that.
479
00:27:27,988 --> 00:27:30,267
(narrator) So President Bush
owned up to it.
480
00:27:31,242 --> 00:27:33,769
I authorized the National Security Agency
481
00:27:34,238 --> 00:27:37,909
to intercept the international
communications of people
482
00:27:37,989 --> 00:27:40,856
with known links to Al-Qaeda,
483
00:27:40,946 --> 00:27:43,655
and related terrorist organizations.
484
00:27:44,523 --> 00:27:47,346
It's taken less than 24 hours
after the Bush presidency ended
485
00:27:47,416 --> 00:27:51,088
for a former analyst of the NSA
to come forward to reveal new allegations
486
00:27:51,158 --> 00:27:54,318
about how this nation was spied on
by its own government.
487
00:27:54,828 --> 00:27:58,428
The National Security Agency has access
to all Americans' communications
488
00:27:58,578 --> 00:28:03,708
-- faxes, phone calls,
and their computer communications.
489
00:28:04,420 --> 00:28:06,932
So, there's a recording somewhere
of every conversation
490
00:28:07,001 --> 00:28:10,567
I had with my little nephew
in upstate New York? Is it like that?
491
00:28:10,660 --> 00:28:12,686
It would be everything, yes.
492
00:28:13,416 --> 00:28:15,278
It would be everything.
493
00:28:16,413 --> 00:28:19,125
(narrator) But, then a beacon of hope
arrived in the White House.
494
00:28:19,786 --> 00:28:22,302
Hi Senator Obama, I appreciate you
giving us the opportunity
495
00:28:22,362 --> 00:28:24,059
to ask you questions.
496
00:28:24,099 --> 00:28:27,148
I'm an attorney who represents
federal whistle-blowers,
497
00:28:27,518 --> 00:28:32,329
and I was very disappointed
when I learned that you supported the Bill
498
00:28:32,409 --> 00:28:35,658
that lets phone companies off the hook
499
00:28:35,708 --> 00:28:41,961
when they've helped
the Federal Government without warrant--
500
00:28:42,841 --> 00:28:45,592
wiretap phones. (applause)
501
00:28:45,722 --> 00:28:47,364
I recognize that some people feel like,
502
00:28:47,424 --> 00:28:50,523
yeah, well, the phone companies
still were complicit in this,
503
00:28:50,573 --> 00:28:53,786
they should be held accountable still
-- I understand that argument.
504
00:28:53,836 --> 00:28:55,879
But the problem was
the surveillance program
505
00:28:55,879 --> 00:28:58,879
is actually one that I believe
is necessary for our national security.
506
00:28:59,140 --> 00:29:00,792
(interviewer) "So they were immune,
507
00:29:00,792 --> 00:29:03,782
but that means that the programs
were still shut down, right?"
508
00:29:04,228 --> 00:29:06,581
The programs are shut down?
509
00:29:06,661 --> 00:29:08,769
(interviewer) "Yeah,
the wiretapping program."
510
00:29:08,883 --> 00:29:11,184
I have no reason to believe
that the wiretapping programs
511
00:29:11,204 --> 00:29:12,624
have been shut down.
512
00:29:12,664 --> 00:29:15,928
No, if the wiretapping programs
had been shut down,
513
00:29:15,988 --> 00:29:21,209
then I don't believe that the government
and AT&T would still be fighting in court
514
00:29:21,269 --> 00:29:23,050
for the legality of it.
515
00:29:23,987 --> 00:29:26,819
(interviewer) "So, Barack Obama
hasn't changed anything?"
516
00:29:26,943 --> 00:29:30,949
No, Barack Obama did not shut
those programs down after he took office,
517
00:29:31,018 --> 00:29:34,666
even though, he had threatened to
before he became president.
518
00:29:41,899 --> 00:29:44,639
When we got started
in my dorm room at Harvard,
519
00:29:45,790 --> 00:29:47,495
the question that
a lot of people asked was,
520
00:29:47,555 --> 00:29:50,865
why would I want to put
any information on the Internet at all,
521
00:29:50,905 --> 00:29:52,613
why would I want to have a website.
522
00:29:52,643 --> 00:29:54,463
And people have really
gotten comfortable,
523
00:29:54,503 --> 00:29:56,781
not only sharing more information
and different kinds,
524
00:29:56,932 --> 00:29:58,916
but more openly and with more people.
525
00:29:58,966 --> 00:30:01,617
And that social norm is just something
that's evolved over time.
526
00:30:02,244 --> 00:30:05,174
You may have seen the Onion
take on Facebook,
527
00:30:05,624 --> 00:30:11,506
which was the CIA has just announced
its most recent handy convention: Facebook
528
00:30:12,266 --> 00:30:14,590
(anchorwoman) According to Department
of Homeland Security reports,
529
00:30:14,630 --> 00:30:17,844
Facebook has replaced almost every other
CIA information gathering program
530
00:30:17,884 --> 00:30:20,243
since it was launched in 2004.
531
00:30:21,239 --> 00:30:23,250
After years
of secretly monitoring the public,
532
00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:26,481
we were astounded
so many people would willingly publicize
533
00:30:26,521 --> 00:30:29,127
where they lived,
their religious and political views,
534
00:30:29,247 --> 00:30:31,556
an alphabetized list
of all their friends,
535
00:30:31,586 --> 00:30:33,876
personal e-mail addresses,
phone numbers,
536
00:30:33,926 --> 00:30:36,204
hundred of photos of themselves,
537
00:30:36,264 --> 00:30:39,375
and even status updates about
what they were doing moment to moment.
538
00:30:39,425 --> 00:30:42,414
It is truly a dream come true for the CIA
539
00:30:42,630 --> 00:30:45,673
You know, the FBIs
and the NSAs of the world
540
00:30:45,844 --> 00:30:49,761
are appreciative of the fact
that Google and Facebook, you know,
541
00:30:49,801 --> 00:30:52,287
had built business models
around collecting user's data,
542
00:30:52,347 --> 00:30:54,553
because it makes their jobs much easier.
543
00:30:54,607 --> 00:30:57,486
There's an article in the Times
that started with this anecdote:
544
00:30:57,506 --> 00:30:59,919
They're sitting
in their transparent cubicle
545
00:30:59,989 --> 00:31:02,430
in their open space in Facebook.
546
00:31:02,901 --> 00:31:07,783
Robert Mueller was the one man in the room
with a tie on, and he was older in a suit,
547
00:31:07,874 --> 00:31:10,520
and he comes in and says:
"I was just in the building
548
00:31:10,560 --> 00:31:12,599
and I wanted to say hello
to Mark Zuckerberg."
549
00:31:12,639 --> 00:31:16,746
So, he says hello to Mark Zuckerberg,
a little chit chat and then, he leaves.
550
00:31:16,796 --> 00:31:19,194
And everyone was saying:
"What the hell was that?".
551
00:31:19,234 --> 00:31:24,964
Now, nobody asked the question:
"Why was Mueller in the building?".
552
00:31:25,033 --> 00:31:27,630
He's the head of the FBI.
553
00:31:28,996 --> 00:31:32,478
So, in the one hand, Mark Zuckerberg
has said he wants to create
554
00:31:32,518 --> 00:31:34,261
a more open society
555
00:31:34,301 --> 00:31:36,907
and Facebook is a way to do that.
556
00:31:36,957 --> 00:31:39,759
And, on the other hand, you know,
557
00:31:39,789 --> 00:31:42,013
there's a lot about the way
Facebook uses information
558
00:31:42,083 --> 00:31:44,317
that people don't know.
559
00:31:44,548 --> 00:31:46,875
(narrator) If only there's a way
of knowing how much information
560
00:31:46,906 --> 00:31:49,048
these companies are storing about us.
561
00:31:49,098 --> 00:31:52,708
Well, in the case of Facebook,
we learned some pretty interesting things
562
00:31:52,768 --> 00:31:54,819
thanks to one student in Austria.
563
00:31:54,869 --> 00:31:58,540
And, unlike the US, Europe has a law
that requires a company to tell a customer
564
00:31:58,540 --> 00:32:02,066
what data they have stored on them,
if that customer wants to know.
565
00:32:02,126 --> 00:32:04,846
And Facebook, unlike
most major Internet companies,
566
00:32:04,906 --> 00:32:06,947
had actually built
a headquarters in Europe.
567
00:32:07,795 --> 00:32:11,028
Apparently we're like the only 3 people
that were like, pushing hard enough,
568
00:32:11,488 --> 00:32:13,619
and like asking again, again and again,
569
00:32:13,689 --> 00:32:16,498
and going through also
the Irish authorities to finally get
570
00:32:16,608 --> 00:32:21,168
at least a bigger part of our data set,
we still didn't get everything right now.
571
00:32:21,878 --> 00:32:25,936
Got it right there. Just to have an idea
of how much it is. (laughter)
572
00:32:26,545 --> 00:32:28,828
- That's like... just to picture it --
- Can I hold it?
573
00:32:28,998 --> 00:32:30,599
and to see how much it is.
574
00:32:30,819 --> 00:32:32,596
Wow, this is more than a baby.
575
00:32:32,646 --> 00:32:35,384
Yeah, that's 1,222 pages.
576
00:32:35,965 --> 00:32:38,013
I'm a member of Facebook for 3 years
577
00:32:38,063 --> 00:32:41,331
but I was using it more intensely
like, for the last 1.5 year or so.
578
00:32:41,671 --> 00:32:44,453
What's interesting is, well,
that I didn't post too much, actually.
579
00:32:44,543 --> 00:32:47,160
Like, I'm a person that posts something
like once a week or so.
580
00:32:47,320 --> 00:32:49,493
With this giant ream of information
in front of me,
581
00:32:49,553 --> 00:32:53,314
is it hard to go through and actually
find specific details about a person?
582
00:32:53,484 --> 00:32:55,275
No, that's super easy because...
583
00:32:55,325 --> 00:32:58,403
I mean, we just use
the search function of the PDF files.
584
00:32:58,543 --> 00:33:00,401
So, you just type in one word, let's say,
585
00:33:00,461 --> 00:33:03,189
"demonstration", or "sex",
or "political party", or something...
586
00:33:03,249 --> 00:33:04,614
- Yeah.
- and within a second
587
00:33:04,714 --> 00:33:06,539
you find the right information.
588
00:33:06,569 --> 00:33:08,785
So, within a couple of minutes
you can figure out what people voted for,
589
00:33:08,845 --> 00:33:13,124
what psychological problems they have,
what parties they've been to...
590
00:33:13,974 --> 00:33:16,892
all these information
are like really easy to find actually.
591
00:33:17,522 --> 00:33:19,340
While using that service
for such a short time,
592
00:33:19,650 --> 00:33:21,891
you still have a data file
that's bigger than anything
593
00:33:21,941 --> 00:33:26,657
that any CIA, FBI, or... I don't know,
Stasi ever had about an average person.
594
00:33:27,147 --> 00:33:30,372
If you hit the remove button,
it just means that it's flagged, deleted.
595
00:33:30,742 --> 00:33:33,928
So, you hide it actually
from yourself, but anyone
596
00:33:33,988 --> 00:33:37,870
like Facebook or any government agency
that wants to look at it later,
597
00:33:37,940 --> 00:33:40,222
can still retrieve it and get it back.
598
00:33:40,272 --> 00:33:43,055
And that being said,
it's there for indefinite time,
599
00:33:44,035 --> 00:33:45,789
even though you hit the delete button
600
00:33:45,829 --> 00:33:48,130
and they asked you three times
if you really, really want to delete it.
601
00:33:48,238 --> 00:33:50,110
(interviewer)
"It's not actually gone?"
602
00:33:50,214 --> 00:33:52,292
It's not actually gone. It's still there.
603
00:33:59,829 --> 00:34:03,315
So, we've ultimately
adopted roughly the following rule...
604
00:34:03,375 --> 00:34:06,979
think of it as we anonymize
the information within 18 months.
605
00:34:07,333 --> 00:34:10,228
It might be anonymized after 18 months
606
00:34:10,308 --> 00:34:13,368
but all of the searches
that we've ever done are still there,
607
00:34:13,468 --> 00:34:17,021
the underlying data is still there
to be de-anonymized at some point.
608
00:34:17,886 --> 00:34:21,780
(narrator) De-anonymizing search records
turns out to be shockingly easy.
609
00:34:21,890 --> 00:34:25,471
That is, taking private searches
and finding out whose records they are.
610
00:34:25,521 --> 00:34:28,950
In 2006, AOL turned over a bunch
of these anonymized search records
611
00:34:28,990 --> 00:34:30,807
of their users to the public.
612
00:34:30,827 --> 00:34:33,352
And it only took a short few hours
for a reporter to quote
613
00:34:33,412 --> 00:34:35,894
who user No. 4417749 was.
614
00:34:35,964 --> 00:34:38,530
Between search for things like
"numb fingers",
615
00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:40,279
"60's single men"
616
00:34:40,339 --> 00:34:42,213
and "dog who urinates
on everything",
617
00:34:42,283 --> 00:34:45,864
the reporter uncover a woman
named Thelma Arnold; she was age 62.
618
00:34:46,274 --> 00:34:49,554
But then, there's user 17556639,
619
00:34:49,624 --> 00:34:52,365
who looked up "how to kill your wife"
multiple times,
620
00:34:52,415 --> 00:34:54,847
along with "decapitated photos",
621
00:34:54,897 --> 00:34:58,023
but then, in the middle, the user actually
looked up "steak and cheese"...
622
00:34:58,093 --> 00:35:00,005
...steak and cheese?
623
00:35:00,696 --> 00:35:02,821
And there were plenty of users online
who were quick to judge
624
00:35:02,881 --> 00:35:04,211
what was going on here.
625
00:35:04,301 --> 00:35:05,939
Yeap, it was murder.
626
00:35:12,668 --> 00:35:15,104
- Winnie, easy, easy --
- Hey, old friend!
627
00:35:15,104 --> 00:35:17,549
Take a sit down in here,
I'm going to show you something.
628
00:35:17,549 --> 00:35:18,873
Ok.
629
00:35:19,227 --> 00:35:23,616
What I'm showing you here
is a list of anonymized search records...
630
00:35:23,676 --> 00:35:27,473
these records were released by AOL.
631
00:35:27,903 --> 00:35:31,832
Are there actually things on this list
that you know you searched for before?
632
00:35:31,892 --> 00:35:37,137
Awww... sure, yeah, I've definitely...
I definitely looked up car crash photos,
633
00:35:37,227 --> 00:35:39,064
I've definitely typed in "decapitated",
634
00:35:39,124 --> 00:35:41,305
I've definitely looked up
dead people photos...
635
00:35:41,385 --> 00:35:44,773
Awww... "wife killer", I've definitely
looked up "wife killer", yeah.
636
00:35:45,293 --> 00:35:47,167
In fact, I've looked up
every single search term
637
00:35:47,227 --> 00:35:48,801
we're looking at here.
638
00:35:48,841 --> 00:35:51,066
[narrator] You see, Jerome has been
a writer on "Cold Case",
639
00:35:51,096 --> 00:35:54,089
a TV show where each week
cops have to solve a murder mystery.
640
00:35:54,310 --> 00:35:57,548
That's always what scared me
when I was entering those search terms
641
00:35:57,898 --> 00:35:59,729
was if there's some kind
of automated system
642
00:35:59,799 --> 00:36:01,660
that just red-flags you
based on search terms
643
00:36:01,700 --> 00:36:03,563
they're not going to look and say,
644
00:36:03,603 --> 00:36:06,116
"Oh, yeah, you're probably
working on a TV show,
645
00:36:06,307 --> 00:36:08,985
and that's why he was just Googling
"how to murder my cheating wife".
646
00:36:09,004 --> 00:36:10,233
(wife) What?
647
00:36:10,303 --> 00:36:11,373
(door opening])
648
00:36:11,393 --> 00:36:12,780
I just wanted to confirm
that I had not murdered you
649
00:36:12,810 --> 00:36:14,527
and that you're alive.
650
00:36:14,727 --> 00:36:17,487
(wife) No, I'm allowed
to come out of this room. (laughter])
651
00:36:17,597 --> 00:36:20,698
- And our baby's safe.
- Ok, good.
652
00:36:20,948 --> 00:36:23,127
- He has a clean diaper.
- Awww... thank God.
653
00:36:23,208 --> 00:36:26,284
So, we can rest assured
you are not a murderer.
654
00:36:26,704 --> 00:36:28,826
I'm not a murderer.
655
00:36:28,886 --> 00:36:30,163
You're a writer.
656
00:36:30,224 --> 00:36:31,854
I'm a writer.
657
00:36:31,934 --> 00:36:33,442
- Ok.
- Glad we can clear that up.
658
00:36:34,021 --> 00:36:36,437
Glad we can clear that up.
659
00:36:36,745 --> 00:36:39,789
(narrator) So, what would happen
if that red-flag system did exist?
660
00:36:40,148 --> 00:36:43,012
If a dad like Jerome might someday
have his door knocked on
661
00:36:43,052 --> 00:36:45,565
because his search records
became pubic?
662
00:36:52,346 --> 00:36:55,396
Consensus seems to be that retention
of this kind of information
663
00:36:55,486 --> 00:36:57,899
should be greater than zero days,
664
00:36:57,969 --> 00:37:01,564
and the reason is it has to do
with police actions, terrorists,
665
00:37:01,624 --> 00:37:04,437
Patriot Act, all of these sort of things.
666
00:37:04,561 --> 00:37:07,112
It turns out that in this environment,
the digital environment,
667
00:37:07,182 --> 00:37:09,409
there is a loophole
to the Fourth Amendment
668
00:37:09,449 --> 00:37:12,291
which is, if a third party collects
a lot of this information
669
00:37:12,341 --> 00:37:14,833
the government doesn't have
to go through those same hoops,
670
00:37:14,933 --> 00:37:17,083
that's called the Third-Party Doctrine.
671
00:37:17,143 --> 00:37:19,727
The Third-Party Doctrine means
672
00:37:19,777 --> 00:37:22,800
that when you as a consumer
share your data with a bank,
673
00:37:22,840 --> 00:37:24,574
with an e-mail provider,
674
00:37:24,614 --> 00:37:26,391
with a search engine,
675
00:37:26,741 --> 00:37:28,781
with any kind of technology company,
676
00:37:28,841 --> 00:37:32,655
you have basically given up
what would have been
677
00:37:32,695 --> 00:37:35,505
your Fourth Amendment protections
over that data.
678
00:37:36,337 --> 00:37:39,146
For the government to get information
from a Google or a Facebook,
679
00:37:39,196 --> 00:37:41,196
it's a lot easier than
the government doing it itself,
680
00:37:41,236 --> 00:37:43,502
by putting a wiretap on our phones.
681
00:37:43,749 --> 00:37:45,739
Large companies like Google and Facebook
682
00:37:45,779 --> 00:37:49,529
receive thousands of requests a year
from government agencies.
683
00:37:49,699 --> 00:37:52,670
Facebook has 25 employees
doing nothing but surveillance.
684
00:37:52,870 --> 00:37:55,564
And these companies
routinely receive requests,
685
00:37:55,694 --> 00:37:57,398
they process the requests--
686
00:37:57,468 --> 00:37:59,403
You may be surprised to hear
687
00:37:59,433 --> 00:38:02,360
the secret search of e-mails
by the government seems to be commonplace.
688
00:38:03,337 --> 00:38:08,983
Law that governs when the government
can get electronic communications,
689
00:38:09,152 --> 00:38:11,876
like e-mails and things
that are stored remotely,
690
00:38:11,986 --> 00:38:14,226
was written in 1986.
691
00:38:14,777 --> 00:38:17,249
And can have effects
that allow the government
692
00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:21,452
to at least claim they should be able
to get location data without a warrant
693
00:38:21,772 --> 00:38:23,794
or, at one point,
the government was claiming
694
00:38:23,814 --> 00:38:27,530
that it doesn't need a warrant
to get emails that you've opened.
695
00:38:35,122 --> 00:38:37,614
Well, in the spring of 2011,
696
00:38:37,694 --> 00:38:40,039
the Department of Justice
and, in particular, the FBI,
697
00:38:40,109 --> 00:38:42,069
made several requests
698
00:38:42,109 --> 00:38:43,274
to Internet companies
699
00:38:43,335 --> 00:38:46,795
as part of an investigation leading
to individuals associated with WikiLeaks.
700
00:38:47,241 --> 00:38:52,246
We released 400,000
classified documents.
701
00:38:52,601 --> 00:38:55,543
(narrator) For those of you
who didn't know who Julian Assange is,
702
00:38:55,543 --> 00:38:57,655
he started WikiLeaks.
703
00:38:57,725 --> 00:39:00,175
Now, in the past WikiLeaks
has released secret documents related
704
00:39:00,205 --> 00:39:03,113
to the Iraq war,
Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan.
705
00:39:03,689 --> 00:39:07,633
And that's obviously
a positive development
706
00:39:08,112 --> 00:39:10,514
for those of us
who think that information
707
00:39:11,474 --> 00:39:14,048
should be more accessible,
almost no matter what.
708
00:39:14,298 --> 00:39:16,133
You know, obviously,
it's a threatening development
709
00:39:16,173 --> 00:39:21,676
for those institutions, like corporations
in many cases, that depend on secrecy.
710
00:39:22,199 --> 00:39:25,054
I condemn the action
that WikiLeaks has taken.
711
00:39:25,164 --> 00:39:27,880
It puts at risk our national security.
712
00:39:28,187 --> 00:39:32,877
Twitter received an order that requested
data regarding certain Twitter users.
713
00:39:33,026 --> 00:39:37,717
These were all users that were related
to the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks.
714
00:39:38,186 --> 00:39:41,571
However, it wasn't just an order,
it was actually a de-order,
715
00:39:41,731 --> 00:39:43,504
and it came with a gag order.
716
00:39:43,544 --> 00:39:46,387
It required that Twitter
never speak publicly
717
00:39:46,437 --> 00:39:48,187
about the fact
that they've received this request.
718
00:39:48,888 --> 00:39:51,227
(TV) Denouncing the move,
Assange said he believes
719
00:39:51,347 --> 00:39:54,878
other American Internet companies,
such as Facebook and Google,
720
00:39:54,908 --> 00:39:57,543
may also have been ordered
to disclose information.
721
00:39:57,653 --> 00:40:00,807
Companies like Amazon, Yahoo, Dropbox...
722
00:40:01,256 --> 00:40:07,117
even Facebook, will be capable
of handing data to the government
723
00:40:07,207 --> 00:40:09,126
without first informing users.
724
00:40:09,647 --> 00:40:11,991
Even if you think
what the people are doing is wrong,
725
00:40:12,971 --> 00:40:15,624
that's why the First Amendment exist:
726
00:40:15,904 --> 00:40:21,402
to protect unpopular people engaging
in unpopular speech.
727
00:40:22,084 --> 00:40:23,624
(narrator) But Twitter fought back.
728
00:40:23,684 --> 00:40:26,497
They released the information of the users
and let them know ahead of time,
729
00:40:26,627 --> 00:40:29,430
and they were successful
in getting the gag order overturned.
730
00:40:29,950 --> 00:40:32,950
Meanwhile, Amazon, Paypal,
Mastercard and Visa,
731
00:40:32,950 --> 00:40:35,331
they all gave in to the pressure
regarding their users.
732
00:40:35,502 --> 00:40:40,553
You know, a culture of loyalty to
not you but a greater cause is important,
733
00:40:40,683 --> 00:40:42,620
to be successful, it seems like to me...
734
00:40:42,760 --> 00:40:44,994
and it's disloyal,
in this case, to the country.
735
00:40:45,312 --> 00:40:47,406
(narrator) Well, President Bush
might think it's disloyal.
736
00:40:47,447 --> 00:40:49,345
Thanks to Twitter standing up
for the privacy of activists
737
00:40:49,385 --> 00:40:52,312
like Julian Assange,
you can now be shown this.
738
00:40:52,693 --> 00:41:00,299
Today we released over 287 files
documenting the reality
739
00:41:00,590 --> 00:41:04,020
of the international
mass surveillance industry.
740
00:41:04,190 --> 00:41:11,649
An industry which now sells equipment
to dictators and democracies alike,
741
00:41:12,128 --> 00:41:16,478
in order to intercept entire populations.
742
00:41:17,307 --> 00:41:19,519
9/11 has provided a license
743
00:41:20,899 --> 00:41:26,501
for European countries, for the USA,
744
00:41:26,521 --> 00:41:30,372
Australia, Canada,
South Africa and others
745
00:41:31,142 --> 00:41:33,536
to develop spying systems
that affect all of us.
746
00:41:40,775 --> 00:41:42,953
(narrator) The Spy Files shows
the massive industry
747
00:41:42,993 --> 00:41:45,060
that surrounds selling to US government
748
00:41:45,090 --> 00:41:47,220
and governments around the world.
749
00:41:47,521 --> 00:41:49,607
Instead of having something called
the Information Awareness Act,
750
00:41:49,627 --> 00:41:52,842
which depicts a symbol with the eye
of the pyramid looking everybody,
751
00:41:52,942 --> 00:41:55,699
and scanning the world
with this sinister laser beam...
752
00:41:56,168 --> 00:41:58,689
Instead, let's just have
a bunch of companies that exist
753
00:41:58,739 --> 00:42:01,128
that are providing
bits of those capabilities,
754
00:42:01,158 --> 00:42:03,313
and they are provided
under the contracts,
755
00:42:03,363 --> 00:42:05,601
that you got for the same agencies,
the same people.
756
00:42:05,900 --> 00:42:08,697
One of the most popular is called
the 'massive intercept',
757
00:42:09,206 --> 00:42:12,512
and basically, what governments
are trying to do with this
758
00:42:13,052 --> 00:42:17,153
is to get as much information
as possible from our communications,
759
00:42:17,213 --> 00:42:21,403
so they can analyze that,
and detect patterns in that.
760
00:42:21,523 --> 00:42:24,622
It's interesting, you know,
in your article you talk about
761
00:42:24,672 --> 00:42:26,776
- the secretive nature of the business--
- Right.
762
00:42:26,816 --> 00:42:29,854
that they sell through trade shows
which are not open to the media...
763
00:42:29,962 --> 00:42:33,677
(narrator) But we actually went to one
of these conventions. It was pretty easy,
764
00:42:33,727 --> 00:42:36,142
we just called and asked for a pass.
765
00:42:37,032 --> 00:42:38,906
So, we talked with a representative
for one of these companies,
766
00:42:38,926 --> 00:42:40,799
a firm called Cellebrite.
767
00:42:40,819 --> 00:42:42,674
They were included in the Spy Files.
768
00:42:42,714 --> 00:42:44,747
They're a company that sells
cellphone extraction tools
769
00:42:44,797 --> 00:42:47,230
to every major government sector
in the US.
770
00:42:47,751 --> 00:42:50,002
So, my name is Christopher Shin,
771
00:42:50,052 --> 00:42:52,659
I'm the Vice-President
of Engineering for Cellebrite USA.
772
00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:54,811
Today, I'm presenting to you
773
00:42:54,841 --> 00:42:57,291
the Cellebrite UFED System,
to my right here.
774
00:42:57,932 --> 00:43:03,144
It is a device used to extract
countless information from mobile devices
775
00:43:03,645 --> 00:43:07,460
so, text messages, pictures, video,
audio, call log, that kind of things...
776
00:43:07,641 --> 00:43:11,185
it's used by agencies across
the United States and the world.
777
00:43:11,666 --> 00:43:14,544
Yes, the iPhone, specifically,
stores a lot of information,
778
00:43:14,595 --> 00:43:16,835
more than your normal handset.
779
00:43:16,895 --> 00:43:20,490
It really is a digital store
of your personal and business life...
780
00:43:21,671 --> 00:43:25,200
This is why the field has actually
been growing exponentially
781
00:43:25,270 --> 00:43:27,100
over the last couple of years.
782
00:43:27,280 --> 00:43:29,780
As the devices get more complex,
they can hold more information,
783
00:43:29,830 --> 00:43:33,661
this is one of the most personal devices
to you today, even more than your laptop.
784
00:43:33,731 --> 00:43:37,098
We think of ourselves as basically,
a tool manufacturer,
785
00:43:37,148 --> 00:43:40,409
just like, you know,
Glock or Beretta producing firearms,
786
00:43:40,459 --> 00:43:44,830
we're producing a tool
that does a certain task,
787
00:43:44,950 --> 00:43:47,078
and we're marketing
that tool only towards...
788
00:43:47,148 --> 00:43:50,386
just like you can't buy... you go out
and buy a hand gun without credentials,
789
00:43:50,426 --> 00:43:52,658
we're not just selling it to everybody.
790
00:43:52,748 --> 00:43:54,738
(interviewer)
"But... could you conceivably sell it
791
00:43:54,778 --> 00:43:56,390
or, are there laws against it?"
792
00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:58,875
There are no laws against selling this
793
00:43:58,935 --> 00:44:02,048
to someone who is not in law enforcement,
the government, or something like that.
794
00:44:02,468 --> 00:44:04,086
Someone who wants
to dump my phone tomorrow
795
00:44:04,116 --> 00:44:06,106
they might get a laugh
at the content in it,
796
00:44:06,246 --> 00:44:08,377
but I don't think I'll be put in jail.
797
00:44:08,417 --> 00:44:12,003
So, I think it really depends
on how you look at it.
798
00:44:12,093 --> 00:44:15,347
I mean, there are privacy concerns
but I'm a little bit more, I guess,
799
00:44:15,938 --> 00:44:20,096
the liberal side of my privacy
being exposed.
800
00:44:20,186 --> 00:44:23,367
I mean, other people, of course...
that's a completely personal view.
801
00:44:23,698 --> 00:44:28,407
My phone itself, I mean, I...
I actually take that back,
802
00:44:28,487 --> 00:44:31,748
I have a lot of work-related information
on my Blackberry
803
00:44:31,818 --> 00:44:36,861
so, if this information did get out,
probably I would be pretty concerned.
804
00:44:37,762 --> 00:44:40,808
The surveillance vendors
target two types of customers.
805
00:44:41,267 --> 00:44:43,312
They target governments directly,
806
00:44:43,362 --> 00:44:46,255
and they also target
Internet service providers
807
00:44:46,365 --> 00:44:49,113
and telecommunications carriers,
808
00:44:49,153 --> 00:44:52,569
who are tasked with the responsibility
of spying on their own customers.
809
00:44:53,466 --> 00:44:55,471
(narrator) For example, it was
a little piece of software
810
00:44:55,501 --> 00:44:57,999
that has been installed
in every phone in America.
811
00:44:58,269 --> 00:45:00,985
This software is called Carrier IQ.
812
00:45:01,344 --> 00:45:04,255
And thanks to a little video
the system's administrators
813
00:45:04,325 --> 00:45:06,340
from Connecticut posted on YouTube,
814
00:45:06,440 --> 00:45:10,171
the world now knows that this software
has been monitoring our every key stroke.
815
00:45:10,832 --> 00:45:15,436
(dialing) (automatic operator speaking)
"Dial 63, and so on, and so forth..."
816
00:45:15,976 --> 00:45:18,669
(narrator) According to Carrier IQ
Chief Marketer, they're aware
817
00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:21,346
this information is sensitive,
and call it a treasure trove.
818
00:45:21,376 --> 00:45:24,109
It became big enough
of a deal that Al Franken
819
00:45:24,159 --> 00:45:26,159
decided to take this issue to Congress.
820
00:45:27,593 --> 00:45:30,797
Mr. Director, millions of Americans
have smart phones
821
00:45:30,897 --> 00:45:35,726
with a pre-installed software
signed by a company called Carrier IQ.
822
00:45:36,666 --> 00:45:42,167
Recent research has shown that it captures
a broad range of sensitive information...
823
00:45:42,427 --> 00:45:44,832
Let me start up by saying
that we had neither sought nor obtained
824
00:45:45,101 --> 00:45:48,301
any information from Carrier IQ
in anyone of our investigations.
825
00:45:48,756 --> 00:45:52,837
Not directly from Carrier, but
what about from the wireless carriers?
826
00:45:53,305 --> 00:45:55,512
No, I don't believe so.
827
00:45:55,572 --> 00:45:58,171
If you're specifying use
828
00:45:58,211 --> 00:46:05,554
of the Carrier IQ software
by another wireless carrier...
829
00:46:05,654 --> 00:46:07,770
... have we sought that?
830
00:46:07,920 --> 00:46:09,385
I do not know,
831
00:46:09,545 --> 00:46:12,635
and the information we seek
from wireless carriers, or what have you--
832
00:46:12,846 --> 00:46:17,467
and I'm not talking about Carrier IQ,
I'm talking about wireless carrier...
833
00:46:17,747 --> 00:46:19,684
- Right.
- that we may have obtained information
834
00:46:19,754 --> 00:46:23,416
that in some way Carrier IQ
may have been involved with.
835
00:46:24,201 --> 00:46:26,475
(narrator) Why would the FBI need
Carrier IQ send them
836
00:46:26,515 --> 00:46:28,249
all of this information?
837
00:46:28,269 --> 00:46:31,075
After all, they could be using
any of these services
838
00:46:31,145 --> 00:46:33,577
that were included in the Spy Files.
839
00:46:33,637 --> 00:46:35,816
Take this product, for instance,
Scan & Target,
840
00:46:35,876 --> 00:46:38,484
which claims that it can search
through the SMSs, the IMs,
841
00:46:38,534 --> 00:46:40,666
Twitter, e-mails,
Facebook, blogs and forums,
842
00:46:40,736 --> 00:46:43,894
or analyze huge volumes
of information in real time.
843
00:46:44,783 --> 00:46:45,944
Or FinFisher, which demonstrate
844
00:46:46,003 --> 00:46:48,326
how the police can infiltrate
anyone's systems,
845
00:46:48,426 --> 00:46:50,765
through a variety of videos
that used to be available
846
00:46:50,795 --> 00:46:52,344
on their website.
847
00:46:52,374 --> 00:46:55,584
They even showed an agent hacking
into Google and Facebook in their demo.
848
00:46:56,704 --> 00:46:59,057
(interviewer)
"Who has this kind of equipment?"
849
00:46:59,828 --> 00:47:04,396
Massive interception equipment is sold
by surveillance vendors around the world.
850
00:47:04,937 --> 00:47:08,598
So, it's really up for grabs for anyone
who wants it and can pay the price.
851
00:47:08,698 --> 00:47:11,990
(narrator) The FinFisher system
was sold to Egypt to monitor people
852
00:47:12,019 --> 00:47:13,555
who opposed their leader.
853
00:47:13,595 --> 00:47:15,894
These are the actual documents.
854
00:47:15,964 --> 00:47:20,040
It even includes training for 2 - 4 people
for the low, low price of about $11,000.
855
00:47:20,800 --> 00:47:22,523
Or the Hacking Team Project,
856
00:47:22,553 --> 00:47:25,319
which advertises that it can track
hundred of thousands of cell phones,
857
00:47:25,449 --> 00:47:26,855
all in one system.
858
00:47:27,024 --> 00:47:30,482
Or software, like Kapow,
that analyzes all social networks,
859
00:47:30,692 --> 00:47:33,893
and features the ability to search out
key words and phrases.
860
00:47:34,873 --> 00:47:36,645
Everything that happens on Facebook,
861
00:47:36,695 --> 00:47:38,620
and it shows the frequency
of the conversation
862
00:47:38,730 --> 00:47:41,196
between one person to another,
that kind of things.
863
00:47:41,681 --> 00:47:43,921
$That allows us for a lot of profiling,
864
00:47:43,981 --> 00:47:47,310
it creates massive databases
for law enforcement to exploit,
865
00:47:47,410 --> 00:47:48,704
and often misread.
866
00:47:49,154 --> 00:47:51,575
(narrator) With hundreds of companies
offering these services,
867
00:47:51,625 --> 00:47:54,461
why would the FBI need to use Carrier IQ?
868
00:47:54,541 --> 00:47:57,720
Everything coming from a cell phone,
everything coming from a computer,
869
00:47:58,100 --> 00:48:00,656
anything that's going over the Internet
870
00:48:00,696 --> 00:48:03,057
out of the country,
or even internal within the country,
871
00:48:03,437 --> 00:48:05,415
can be monitored
using this kind of equipment.
872
00:48:05,445 --> 00:48:08,205
If you look at news stories now
about what they call Big Data,
873
00:48:08,255 --> 00:48:11,965
Big Data is really
looking at the question of
874
00:48:12,174 --> 00:48:16,500
how can governments
and corporations work with that data
875
00:48:16,620 --> 00:48:22,017
in order to look for anomalies and predict
when you're going to do something,
876
00:48:22,087 --> 00:48:24,366
so they can stop you from doing it.
877
00:48:24,866 --> 00:48:27,238
(narrator) And the government
isn't that secretive about it.
878
00:48:27,458 --> 00:48:29,677
If you visit their business website,
there's an application there
879
00:48:29,737 --> 00:48:31,962
looking for developers
to create better tools
880
00:48:31,972 --> 00:48:34,038
for mass surveillance
for online activities.
881
00:48:34,098 --> 00:48:36,981
Examples of surveillance include,
but are not limited to:
882
00:48:37,150 --> 00:48:42,091
Fox News, CNN, MSNBC,
Twitter, Facebook, etc.
883
00:48:42,741 --> 00:48:45,511
Which brings us back to that word
that you find in any user's agreement.
884
00:48:45,992 --> 00:48:48,636
It's the word that sent us down
this whole path in the first place:
885
00:48:48,736 --> 00:48:49,891
"Prevent."
886
00:48:49,982 --> 00:48:51,979
So, this might make you wonder,
887
00:48:52,048 --> 00:48:54,564
what potential threat would all
of this surveillance we agreed to
888
00:48:54,684 --> 00:48:56,460
actually prevent?
889
00:49:07,354 --> 00:49:11,353
Basically, January 3rd,
20 days before I go on holiday, I tweet:
890
00:49:12,143 --> 00:49:13,854
"Are you free this week
for a quick gossip/prep
891
00:49:13,924 --> 00:49:15,925
before I go and destroy America?"
892
00:49:15,976 --> 00:49:18,997
Ended the twit with a kiss
-- as threatening as that is,
893
00:49:19,166 --> 00:49:22,140
and 20 days later,
got on a flight to go to LAX,
894
00:49:22,320 --> 00:49:25,076
we had a hotel in Hollywood Boulevard,
895
00:49:25,156 --> 00:49:26,762
where we were going
to park around for a week,
896
00:49:26,852 --> 00:49:28,288
just looking around, just being tourists.
897
00:49:28,698 --> 00:49:31,434
Got off the plane,
went through the passport control,
898
00:49:31,574 --> 00:49:33,366
swiped my passport through,
and they said, "Can you come this way?".
899
00:49:33,436 --> 00:49:36,044
And I was like, I just got
an Irish passport, so I thought
900
00:49:36,154 --> 00:49:39,586
maybe Irish people are stereotyped,
IRA bombers...
901
00:49:39,666 --> 00:49:42,393
They went through my suitcase and,
I was like... Awww, what are you doing?
902
00:49:43,183 --> 00:49:44,890
And then, when they put me
in the holding room,
903
00:49:44,950 --> 00:49:47,666
they were questioning me for 5 hours
whether I had a Twitter account...
904
00:49:47,926 --> 00:49:50,092
And I was like, "Are you being serious?
Are you actually holding me
905
00:49:50,122 --> 00:49:51,308
because of a tweet?"
906
00:49:51,408 --> 00:49:54,116
And they were like, "What do you mean
by destroy America?",
907
00:49:54,266 --> 00:49:58,083
and I was like... to party... it means,
to go wild, to get drunk...
908
00:49:58,613 --> 00:50:02,350
Any moron that can read that tweet
can see what it meant to us.
909
00:50:02,570 --> 00:50:04,371
It ends with a kiss.
910
00:50:04,841 --> 00:50:07,957
I'm sure Hitler doesn't end his memoirs
with a kiss... or whatever he did.
911
00:50:08,097 --> 00:50:09,258
(laughter)
912
00:50:09,318 --> 00:50:11,368
So, then they moved us to a holding room,
913
00:50:11,418 --> 00:50:13,543
then at midnight the staff changed over,
914
00:50:13,613 --> 00:50:15,388
and they weren't aware of
why we were there for,
915
00:50:15,418 --> 00:50:17,971
so the handcuffed us,
stuck us in the back of a police van,
916
00:50:18,051 --> 00:50:21,042
and they took us to downtown,
like a prison detention center...
917
00:50:23,482 --> 00:50:26,330
Innocent people shouldn't
be treated like absolute dirt,
918
00:50:26,720 --> 00:50:29,626
and they were dragging us around,
pushing us into walls...
919
00:50:29,776 --> 00:50:32,054
- It sounds like a horrible vacation--
- Awww...
920
00:50:32,454 --> 00:50:34,206
Is the government
refunding you at least?
921
00:50:34,266 --> 00:50:37,654
No, they wouldn't comment
on what happened.
922
00:50:38,254 --> 00:50:40,238
Well, if I could I was going
to paint the town red,
923
00:50:40,428 --> 00:50:42,822
they'd have me down
for graffiti as well, wouldn't they?
924
00:50:43,142 --> 00:50:45,137
When I go to other countries,
this is going to show up,
925
00:50:45,317 --> 00:50:47,342
that I got refused from America,
926
00:50:47,572 --> 00:50:49,849
so more than likely, I'm now
going to get dragged off every airport
927
00:50:49,919 --> 00:50:52,331
and questioned about what happened,
928
00:50:52,391 --> 00:50:54,741
and I'll have to explain to them
that it was a tweet.
929
00:50:55,471 --> 00:50:59,210
My Italian, Irish, French, Portuguese,
930
00:50:59,300 --> 00:51:03,980
Native American, Black...
I'm even 1/18 Avatar (laughter)
931
00:51:04,500 --> 00:51:06,356
(narrator) This is Joe Lipari.
932
00:51:06,436 --> 00:51:08,779
Joe Lipari had had a rough day
at the Apple store.
933
00:51:08,819 --> 00:51:11,624
He's been forced to wait in line
for 4 hours before finally leaving.
934
00:51:13,714 --> 00:51:17,102
So, I get home from the Apple store,
still a little bit irritated...
935
00:51:18,612 --> 00:51:22,887
smoked a little dope, put on Fight Club,
just trying to relax, go on Facebook...
936
00:51:23,807 --> 00:51:28,468
(TV) And this button-down,
Oxford-cloth psycho might just snap,
937
00:51:28,568 --> 00:51:30,956
and then stalk from office to office...
938
00:51:31,376 --> 00:51:34,319
(Joe and TV) ...with an Armalite AR-10 carbine
gas-powered semi-automatic weapon...
939
00:51:34,749 --> 00:51:37,532
And I said the same thing
but except, for the Apple store.
940
00:51:38,222 --> 00:51:43,248
And, you know, basically word for word
except for where.
941
00:51:43,908 --> 00:51:46,118
Hanging out on Facebook,
getting ready to go to yoga class,
942
00:51:46,228 --> 00:51:49,385
there's a 'Shave and a Haircut'
'Two bits' knock on my door.
943
00:51:49,945 --> 00:51:53,689
So, I was like, maybe somebody is here
to watch Fight Club with me.
944
00:51:53,819 --> 00:51:56,634
Opened it up, boom!
945
00:51:56,874 --> 00:52:00,094
NYPD SWAT have their bulletproof vests on,
their guns drawn,
946
00:52:00,805 --> 00:52:03,652
and they tear the place apart!
947
00:52:04,332 --> 00:52:06,112
They really go through everything.
948
00:52:06,193 --> 00:52:09,776
Under one cup, you know, the guy finds
a box that has all my military awards,
949
00:52:09,996 --> 00:52:12,446
he comes and brings it and says,
"Oh, you were in the military?"
950
00:52:12,606 --> 00:52:15,866
Then we started talking army talk,
he sees that I speak the language,
951
00:52:15,976 --> 00:52:19,215
and then is when he asks me,
"Do you know what's an Armalite AR-10?",
952
00:52:19,745 --> 00:52:22,202
and I was like,
"It's that why you're here, guys?
953
00:52:22,382 --> 00:52:25,490
You are here because
I made a bad joke on Facebook?",
954
00:52:25,770 --> 00:52:28,660
like I... you know, it blew my mind.
955
00:52:29,330 --> 00:52:31,554
It's the ultimate buzz kill, really!
956
00:52:32,164 --> 00:52:34,530
Those Facebook pages brought
a SWAT team to your house!
957
00:52:34,740 --> 00:52:37,636
They told me not to go far from New York
958
00:52:37,696 --> 00:52:40,164
because I'm gonna be needed
for all these court cases for a year.
959
00:52:40,224 --> 00:52:44,586
They claimed
one of my Facebook friends called 911.
960
00:52:47,095 --> 00:52:49,884
Which is another thing I think is bogus,
961
00:52:50,234 --> 00:52:52,124
so I asked for the 911 tape,
962
00:52:52,305 --> 00:52:55,137
which they keep on file, they have to.
963
00:52:55,268 --> 00:52:58,781
And it's my right, my stuff, they have
to give me my mug shot if I want it.
964
00:52:59,491 --> 00:53:04,171
So they came back and said, "Oh, turned out
it wasn't someone who called 911,
965
00:53:04,292 --> 00:53:06,371
it was just someone
who walked-in to the police station
966
00:53:06,401 --> 00:53:08,265
and that's something
we don't keep a record of."
967
00:53:08,665 --> 00:53:11,111
And how did you get my address?
I've lived there for just 10 days.
968
00:53:11,572 --> 00:53:14,967
(laughter) I didn't update
my mailing address yet,
969
00:53:15,467 --> 00:53:17,416
like all my banking stuff is still
going to my old apartment,
970
00:53:17,476 --> 00:53:22,083
like there's nothing saying I lived there,
except for a verbal agreement.
971
00:53:24,284 --> 00:53:26,132
Three minutes
after being done with my lunch
972
00:53:26,182 --> 00:53:28,492
I was told to go up to the office,
973
00:53:28,582 --> 00:53:33,106
then I would sit down inside
the Vice-Principal office,
974
00:53:33,196 --> 00:53:38,408
and I wasn't told what was going on
until, maybe, 10 minutes later.
975
00:53:38,568 --> 00:53:40,219
(Timi Robertson) My phone rang
and I looked at it,
976
00:53:40,259 --> 00:53:41,720
and it was the number of his school,
977
00:53:41,760 --> 00:53:44,180
and I answered it,
and it was the school security guard
978
00:53:44,661 --> 00:53:47,446
just to giving me an FYI, you know...
979
00:53:47,506 --> 00:53:50,035
"For your information
just to give you a heads up,
980
00:53:50,095 --> 00:53:52,232
the Secret Service is here
with the Town Police Department,
981
00:53:52,302 --> 00:53:54,432
and they have Vito,
and they're talking to him."
982
00:53:54,532 --> 00:53:58,007
(Vito) A man walked-in
in a suit and glasses,
983
00:54:00,007 --> 00:54:04,900
and he said that he was part
of the Secret Service,
984
00:54:04,940 --> 00:54:07,259
and he told me that it was
because of a post that I'd made,
985
00:54:07,379 --> 00:54:10,563
and it's indicated
as a threat towards the President.
986
00:54:10,643 --> 00:54:13,948
(narrator) Yes, a seventh-grade boy
was visited by our FBI
987
00:54:13,988 --> 00:54:16,940
because of a red flag
that came up in their spy system.
988
00:54:17,310 --> 00:54:21,876
I was saying how Osama is dead,
and for Obama to be careful
989
00:54:21,946 --> 00:54:24,180
because there might be suicide bombers.
990
00:54:24,621 --> 00:54:26,609
(narrator) It didn't consider his age,
991
00:54:26,669 --> 00:54:30,115
or that his comment about Obama
needing to 'Watch out!' was one of concern
992
00:54:30,175 --> 00:54:33,154
The machine simply determined that
based in a series of words...
993
00:54:33,204 --> 00:54:35,603
Vito was a potential threat.
994
00:54:43,899 --> 00:54:49,526
Pre-crime, they believe,
is potential breach to the peace.
995
00:54:51,205 --> 00:54:54,204
They believe that you might cause a crime.
996
00:54:55,795 --> 00:54:57,975
There are pre-crime arrests
in minority report.
997
00:54:59,715 --> 00:55:01,798
Mr. Marks, by mandate
of the District of Columbia
998
00:55:01,848 --> 00:55:03,030
Pre-crime Division,
999
00:55:03,070 --> 00:55:05,174
I'm placing you under arrest
for the future murder of [Sarah Mars]
1000
00:55:05,234 --> 00:55:09,384
that is known to be taking place today,
April 22nd, 0800 hours and 4 minutes.
1001
00:55:09,434 --> 00:55:11,199
No! I didn't do anything!
1002
00:55:11,249 --> 00:55:13,224
There's an arrest that happened
on the Royal Wedding day
1003
00:55:13,284 --> 00:55:16,515
when I attended a Zombie Flashmob
Wedding Picnic.
1004
00:55:18,014 --> 00:55:20,520
Myself and 4 other zombies
were arrested preemptively
1005
00:55:20,580 --> 00:55:23,618
for potential breach to the peace.
1006
00:55:23,678 --> 00:55:25,491
Even if you dress up as a zombie,
1007
00:55:25,621 --> 00:55:27,917
it seems to me that the crime
isn't really committed,
1008
00:55:28,026 --> 00:55:29,854
- until you eat some brains--
- Yeap.
1009
00:55:29,994 --> 00:55:32,972
To be fair, we did have
some "brain cake", so there's that...?
1010
00:55:33,231 --> 00:55:36,471
How did they know that you were going
to be dressing up as a zombie this day?
1011
00:55:36,611 --> 00:55:38,886
There could have been
e-mails, or anything...
1012
00:55:38,986 --> 00:55:41,175
There could have been,
it's hard to know, yeah.
1013
00:55:41,386 --> 00:55:43,348
I think that--
- That's a scary thing, yeah.
1014
00:55:43,398 --> 00:55:47,565
The indication that they were
monitoring private social networks
1015
00:55:47,675 --> 00:55:50,375
came in the way we were reacting
to certain things,
1016
00:55:50,415 --> 00:55:52,198
and asking us certain things.
1017
00:55:52,228 --> 00:55:54,499
They were asking about "maggots"
and asking about "climbing gear",
1018
00:55:54,559 --> 00:55:56,743
which they might have heard about
through some exchanges on the Internet.
1019
00:55:56,793 --> 00:55:59,388
Neither of which is true, nobody
had maggots or climbing gear.
1020
00:55:59,548 --> 00:56:04,066
Not something that was itself posing
a hazard to the Royal Wedding celebrations
1021
00:56:04,126 --> 00:56:06,339
we were nowhere near
the Royal Wedding celebrations,
1022
00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:09,393
and we had no plan of going near
the Royal Wedding celebrations.
1023
00:56:09,473 --> 00:56:15,331
Anything that wasn't part of the official,
ostentatious, joyous expensive celebration
1024
00:56:15,402 --> 00:56:20,723
of this wedding of two strangers,
was prevented from happening.
1025
00:56:20,923 --> 00:56:23,923
And that seems deeply disturbing.
1026
00:56:24,503 --> 00:56:27,288
You can see the surveillance measures
are being used to silence protests
1027
00:56:27,539 --> 00:56:29,458
before they even happen.
1028
00:56:29,608 --> 00:56:31,618
Yes, this was of course
the Royal Wedding...
1029
00:56:32,468 --> 00:56:37,564
We'd all helped pay for the Royal Wedding,
you know, it wasn't just a private wedding
1030
00:56:38,814 --> 00:56:40,319
You're arresting
a professor of anthropology
1031
00:56:40,369 --> 00:56:42,395
that runs a street theater group...
1032
00:56:42,456 --> 00:56:44,763
[people talking and shouting]
1033
00:56:46,693 --> 00:56:48,297
We couldn't believe
this was happening,
1034
00:56:48,458 --> 00:56:50,535
we were so obviously
a street theater troupe.
1035
00:56:51,495 --> 00:56:53,664
Some of us, had actually
gotten a costume on, you know.
1036
00:56:54,113 --> 00:56:57,285
So, we were locked away
in Lewisham Police Station for 25 hours,
1037
00:56:57,876 --> 00:57:00,103
once the whole wedding
was safely over, we were let out.
1038
00:57:01,554 --> 00:57:03,990
For the first time, as far as
I'm aware in this country,
1039
00:57:04,329 --> 00:57:07,191
a number of us, something like 50 of us,
1040
00:57:07,241 --> 00:57:11,339
were arrested,
and in most cases, incarcerated,
1041
00:57:11,450 --> 00:57:14,715
for thinking about protest,
1042
00:57:14,795 --> 00:57:17,441
for thinking about,
in this case, some street theater.
1043
00:57:21,750 --> 00:57:24,838
A lot of life is based upon trust...
1044
00:57:25,147 --> 00:57:29,080
If you have a conversation
with your inner circle
1045
00:57:29,641 --> 00:57:34,265
on a key strategic decision
that is vital to your company,
1046
00:57:34,816 --> 00:57:37,799
and you read about it in the newspaper
before the decision is implemented,
1047
00:57:37,859 --> 00:57:42,396
so it's preempted from acting because
somebody inside your company has talked,
1048
00:57:42,477 --> 00:57:44,864
you aren't going to like it,
and it'll hurt.
1049
00:57:45,704 --> 00:57:47,795
(narrator) The activists didn't need
to commit any crime.
1050
00:57:47,875 --> 00:57:51,187
They just needed to text, to e-mail,
and to call each other
1051
00:57:51,357 --> 00:57:53,250
about potentially protesting.
1052
00:57:53,430 --> 00:57:57,756
But I think that the answer is not
to take away the capacity of looking at
1053
00:57:57,786 --> 00:58:00,912
the public action of citizens
and keeping a record of it,
1054
00:58:01,161 --> 00:58:03,859
the solution is to make sure
that we elect better governments.
1055
00:58:04,258 --> 00:58:07,232
(interviewer) "So, one
of the things I hear a lot is,
1056
00:58:07,493 --> 00:58:10,573
who cares if they're collecting
all this information about me,
1057
00:58:10,683 --> 00:58:13,872
I don't have anything to hide
so, why does it matter?"
1058
00:58:14,722 --> 00:58:21,185
Well, I know this argument
and it is not very new,
1059
00:58:22,455 --> 00:58:30,090
it's old-fashion saying we are complying
with rules so, what happens?
1060
00:58:30,971 --> 00:58:34,951
Between leading the sinful life
that I would like to lead,
1061
00:58:35,000 --> 00:58:37,228
and hoping that the government
will protect my privacy
1062
00:58:37,268 --> 00:58:39,477
or, assuming that no one
is going to protect my privacy
1063
00:58:39,518 --> 00:58:41,946
and leading a less sinful life,
1064
00:58:42,025 --> 00:58:46,168
I'd go with the latter... simply, just
the odds of success seem higher to me.
1065
00:58:47,098 --> 00:58:49,455
I congratulate the people
that say they have nothing to hide.
1066
00:58:49,606 --> 00:58:51,543
I don't believe them, and I'd also say
1067
00:58:51,603 --> 00:58:54,786
that they're probably hiding something
from someone. We all do.
1068
00:58:54,846 --> 00:58:57,047
You have nothing to hide till you do.
1069
00:58:57,648 --> 00:59:01,193
And you're not necessarily going to know
what you have to hide or not.
1070
00:59:08,337 --> 00:59:10,430
(narrator) You might remember
the case of Milly,
1071
00:59:10,470 --> 00:59:14,036
a teenage girl in Britain
who disappeared in 2002.
1072
00:59:14,496 --> 00:59:17,756
(TV) "Police in Surrey say
they're growing increasingly concerned
1073
00:59:17,896 --> 00:59:20,700
about the safety of the 13-year-old girl
who hasn't been seen
1074
00:59:20,770 --> 00:59:22,784
since Thursday afternoon."
1075
00:59:23,263 --> 00:59:25,188
(narrator) Before the police
found her body,
1076
00:59:25,318 --> 00:59:27,931
her parents were holding onto hopes
that she might still be alive.
1077
00:59:29,450 --> 00:59:33,915
I want to say if someone
has taken Milly and is holding her,
1078
00:59:34,114 --> 00:59:37,032
then please, please,
giver her back to us...
1079
00:59:37,162 --> 00:59:39,628
(narrator) Why is that, you might ask.
1080
00:59:39,688 --> 00:59:42,255
Well, because
according to phone records,
1081
00:59:42,525 --> 00:59:44,741
Milly has checked
and deleted her voicemail.
1082
00:59:45,200 --> 00:59:48,334
We were sitting downstairs
in reception and I rang her phone...
1083
00:59:48,605 --> 00:59:51,848
- Yes.
- and it clicked through onto her voice message,
1084
00:59:51,968 --> 00:59:53,898
- so I heard her voice--
- Yes.
1085
00:59:54,047 --> 00:59:56,220
and I was... it was just like I jumped,
1086
00:59:56,430 --> 00:59:59,324
"She's picked up her voicemails, Bob,
she's alive!", and I was just...
1087
01:00:00,044 --> 01:00:01,478
it was then, really.
1088
01:00:01,879 --> 01:00:04,382
(narrator) As it turned out, members
of the Rupert Murdoch's Corporation
1089
01:00:04,442 --> 01:00:06,448
had been hacking into Milly's phone,
1090
01:00:06,508 --> 01:00:09,806
trying to be the first to reveal details
of this national news story.
1091
01:00:10,906 --> 01:00:12,488
I think this is the watershed moment
1092
01:00:12,558 --> 01:00:17,769
when finally the public start to see,
and feel above all,
1093
01:00:17,949 --> 01:00:23,920
just how low and how disgusting
this particular newspaper's methods were.
1094
01:00:24,659 --> 01:00:26,854
This was a murdered schoolgirl,
1095
01:00:26,884 --> 01:00:34,195
and the thought of a very tight-knit
circle of very senior politicians,
1096
01:00:35,115 --> 01:00:38,490
linked up very closely,
intimately, with the police
1097
01:00:38,921 --> 01:00:42,585
and with the media mogul,
Rupert Murdoch.
1098
01:00:44,505 --> 01:00:46,285
(TV) For 30 years,
as British Prime Ministers came,
1099
01:00:46,365 --> 01:00:47,856
and most certainly went,
1100
01:00:47,896 --> 01:00:51,615
a constant character in their worlds
was Rupert Murdoch.
1101
01:00:52,896 --> 01:00:55,596
The billionaire media mogul whose press...
1102
01:00:55,646 --> 01:00:57,960
(narrator) For years, celebrities
and individuals like Milly,
1103
01:00:58,039 --> 01:01:00,836
had their voicemail,
they thought was hidden in private,
1104
01:01:00,916 --> 01:01:03,029
accessed by
Rupert Murdoch Corporation,
1105
01:01:03,089 --> 01:01:05,537
at the expense of people
like Milly's parents,
1106
01:01:05,567 --> 01:01:09,971
and it took nearly a decade to expose
the misuse of this highly personal data.
1107
01:01:17,224 --> 01:01:20,344
Transparency which bonds us together
and gives us so many friends
1108
01:01:20,374 --> 01:01:22,517
that we didn't know before,
(laughter)
1109
01:01:22,557 --> 01:01:24,682
but all these friends are connected,
1110
01:01:24,772 --> 01:01:30,834
gives the state, an absolutely
unparalleled in the history of humanity,
1111
01:01:30,944 --> 01:01:35,808
ability to know what's going on
with its citizens,
1112
01:01:35,888 --> 01:01:38,217
to find out who the dissenters are...
1113
01:01:38,267 --> 01:01:41,191
The government is making
whistle-blowing a crime.
1114
01:01:42,852 --> 01:01:45,726
They are making dissent a crime,
1115
01:01:46,485 --> 01:01:48,599
especially when
it embarrasses the government
1116
01:01:48,679 --> 01:01:50,834
and calls the government into account.
1117
01:01:50,964 --> 01:01:53,308
Sources are going to get discovered,
1118
01:01:53,358 --> 01:01:57,050
and if whistle-blowers
cannot securely and anonymously
1119
01:01:57,100 --> 01:01:59,035
provide their information to journalists,
1120
01:01:59,115 --> 01:02:01,779
we as a society won't know
when our rights are being
1121
01:02:01,869 --> 01:02:03,531
silently violated.
1122
01:02:15,902 --> 01:02:17,945
Of course the President
has defended his administration...
1123
01:02:19,294 --> 01:02:20,785
the only way he knows how.
1124
01:02:20,935 --> 01:02:23,846
If we can root out folks
who have leaked,
1125
01:02:24,675 --> 01:02:26,837
they will suffer consequences.
1126
01:02:27,416 --> 01:02:29,499
(laughter)
1127
01:02:37,474 --> 01:02:39,699
If you look at the technical perspective,
1128
01:02:39,760 --> 01:02:41,513
the technologies of maintaining privacy
1129
01:02:41,573 --> 01:02:45,128
are actually running ahead
of the technologiess that break it.
1130
01:02:45,178 --> 01:02:48,398
For example, encryption,
which can maintain your privacy,
1131
01:02:48,538 --> 01:02:50,412
is running ahead of decryption.
1132
01:02:50,492 --> 01:02:52,469
(narrator) But what if there's a way
to store information
1133
01:02:52,529 --> 01:02:54,036
until it can be decrypted?
1134
01:02:54,596 --> 01:02:56,403
Intelligence officials
will soon be allowed
1135
01:02:56,433 --> 01:02:59,917
to keep information on US citizens
much longer than they used to,
1136
01:03:00,516 --> 01:03:03,915
even if those citizens
have not known ties to terrorism.
1137
01:03:04,064 --> 01:03:08,176
Under new rules, the government
can store data it's gathered for 5 years,
1138
01:03:08,436 --> 01:03:10,511
that's up from the current limit
of 6 months.
1139
01:03:11,191 --> 01:03:17,056
General Alexander,
if Dick Cheney were elected President
1140
01:03:17,126 --> 01:03:22,276
and wanted to detain and incessantly
waterboard every American
1141
01:03:22,366 --> 01:03:26,647
who's sent an e-mail making fun
of his well-known hunting mishaps,
1142
01:03:27,267 --> 01:03:33,373
what I'd like to know is does the NSA
have the technological capacity
1143
01:03:34,463 --> 01:03:40,475
to identify those Cheney bashers,
based upon the content of their e-mails.
1144
01:03:42,385 --> 01:03:45,427
In the United States,
we would have to go through
1145
01:03:45,527 --> 01:03:49,319
an FBI process of warrant to get that,
1146
01:03:49,419 --> 01:03:51,461
and serve it to somebody
to actually get it.
1147
01:03:52,281 --> 01:03:55,030
- But you do have capability of doing it?--
- Not in the United States.
1148
01:03:55,650 --> 01:03:58,616
New questions about
the National Security Agency's
1149
01:03:58,646 --> 01:04:01,675
massive spy center
under construction in the desert of Utah.
1150
01:04:02,205 --> 01:04:05,985
Once finished, it'll be five times
the size of the US Capitol building.
1151
01:04:06,034 --> 01:04:08,600
The NSA is not allowed
to spy on Americans,
1152
01:04:08,660 --> 01:04:12,223
but now a whistle-blower has come forward
saying that the agency is doing it anyway.
1153
01:04:12,323 --> 01:04:16,770
This massive agency that is collecting
a tremendous amount of information
1154
01:04:16,800 --> 01:04:20,552
every day by satellites,
and tapping the cell phones,
1155
01:04:20,602 --> 01:04:24,014
and data links, and your computer
e-mail links, and so forth.
1156
01:04:24,114 --> 01:04:29,523
And then it has to store it someplace
and that's why they'll build Bluffdale.
1157
01:04:29,623 --> 01:04:32,465
So, it's going to cost 2 billion dollars
1158
01:04:32,505 --> 01:04:34,826
and it's being built in this area,
1159
01:04:34,927 --> 01:04:39,400
on a military base outside
of Salt Lake City, in Bluffdale.
1160
01:04:39,810 --> 01:04:44,315
As I said, they had to actually extend
the boundaries of the town,
1161
01:04:44,475 --> 01:04:46,158
so that it would fit into it.
1162
01:04:46,308 --> 01:04:49,672
And the whole purpose of this
is the centerpiece
1163
01:04:49,993 --> 01:04:56,508
of this massive eavesdropping
complex, this network created after 9/11.
1164
01:04:58,323 --> 01:05:02,895
The reality of information technology
is that it progresses exponentially
1165
01:05:02,956 --> 01:05:04,847
--only information technology.
1166
01:05:04,908 --> 01:05:08,908
Exponential grow starts out very slow,
looks like nothing is happening,
1167
01:05:08,997 --> 01:05:10,790
is doubling in time in little numbers,
1168
01:05:10,830 --> 01:05:13,016
and suddenly, it takes off...
1169
01:05:13,036 --> 01:05:15,237
and you've seen that
with paradigm after paradigm,
1170
01:05:15,287 --> 01:05:17,573
like social networks in recent times.
1171
01:05:17,773 --> 01:05:22,301
(narrator) In 1984,
to sort 1 GB of data cost $85,000.
1172
01:05:22,949 --> 01:05:26,534
By 2012, it cost about 5 cents.
1173
01:05:26,873 --> 01:05:30,083
In the city of Chongqing,
there are about 500,000 cameras.
1174
01:05:30,160 --> 01:05:35,443
In 2012, the cost of permanently recording
at high resolution feed was $300 million.
1175
01:05:35,890 --> 01:05:39,919
By year 2020, the projected cost
is less than $3 million.
1176
01:05:40,258 --> 01:05:43,225
The UK is one of the cultures
that introduced cameras
1177
01:05:43,265 --> 01:05:45,738
most ubiquitously and most quickly.
1178
01:05:45,828 --> 01:05:48,466
So far, the population
seems fine with it.
1179
01:05:48,556 --> 01:05:51,984
If they weren't, they know who to call.
1180
01:05:52,153 --> 01:05:57,329
(narrator) There are 2,000 cameras,
and soon there will be 3,000.
1181
01:05:57,639 --> 01:06:02,454
All of which feed into this control center
housed in a secret location.
1182
01:06:03,294 --> 01:06:06,151
And I can call up in real time
1183
01:06:06,271 --> 01:06:10,386
all instances where a camera
caught someone wearing a red shirt.
1184
01:06:10,456 --> 01:06:13,286
This is the shape and the size
1185
01:06:13,346 --> 01:06:16,188
of a potentially suspicious
unattended package.
1186
01:06:16,388 --> 01:06:19,684
Many police departments
set to use controversial new devices
1187
01:06:19,734 --> 01:06:22,309
capable of scanning people's faces,
1188
01:06:22,409 --> 01:06:25,360
then checking that information
against a criminal database.
1189
01:06:26,060 --> 01:06:28,495
When we're at war,
when you're protecting your society
1190
01:06:28,545 --> 01:06:30,871
against people who want come
and kill civilians,
1191
01:06:31,441 --> 01:06:34,247
you have to be able
to defend what we're doing.
1192
01:06:34,907 --> 01:06:36,831
You have to be able
to defend our way of life,
1193
01:06:37,641 --> 01:06:40,683
and you have to put these powers
into somebody's hand.
1194
01:06:40,873 --> 01:06:43,171
(narrator) According to
the Brookings Institution,
1195
01:06:43,231 --> 01:06:46,236
"this kind of pervasive monitoring
provides what amounts to a time machine
1196
01:06:46,276 --> 01:06:50,046
allowing authoritarian governments
to perform retrospective surveillance."
1197
01:06:50,416 --> 01:06:53,465
For example,
if an anti-regime demonstrator
1198
01:06:53,555 --> 01:06:56,032
previously unknown
to security services is arrested,
1199
01:06:56,262 --> 01:06:58,565
it'll be possible to go back in time
1200
01:06:58,615 --> 01:07:00,547
to scrutinize the demonstrator's
phone conversations,
1201
01:07:00,597 --> 01:07:03,067
automobile travels,
and the people he or she met
1202
01:07:03,137 --> 01:07:05,696
in the months, and even years
leading up to the arrest.
1203
01:07:08,466 --> 01:07:12,819
The government is using the existence
of terms of service to justify
1204
01:07:13,209 --> 01:07:15,090
the surveillance state
that we know live in.
1205
01:07:15,570 --> 01:07:18,840
The messages are free to use,
and most importantly, they're encrypted,
1206
01:07:18,880 --> 01:07:22,263
so the police can't actually get in there
to uncrypt what happened.
1207
01:07:22,303 --> 01:07:25,565
That prompted calls to shut down
the entire network.
1208
01:07:25,865 --> 01:07:29,719
(narrator) It's easy to justify using
these technologies to stop a riot,
1209
01:07:29,769 --> 01:07:32,437
but shouldn't we be concerned
when the government is able
1210
01:07:32,457 --> 01:07:35,563
to read our e-mails, text messages,
phone calls, search history,
1211
01:07:35,603 --> 01:07:37,972
to track our movement
and limit our free speech?
1212
01:07:38,942 --> 01:07:40,948
What crime did that 7th grade boy
really commit?
1213
01:07:41,498 --> 01:07:43,773
Is having zombies to the Royal Wedding
really so bad?
1214
01:07:44,223 --> 01:07:45,996
What about Milly's parents?
1215
01:07:46,297 --> 01:07:48,928
And what happen when these technologies
are used to watch peaceful protesters,
1216
01:07:49,098 --> 01:07:52,642
like all the people who occupy Wall Street
or the Tea Party folks?
1217
01:07:53,322 --> 01:07:56,830
What happens if the government
doesn't like tents being set up?
1218
01:07:57,280 --> 01:08:03,220
(people shouting) Stop beating students!
Stop beating students!
1219
01:08:05,180 --> 01:08:09,295
(narrator) Despite all of this,
it was starting to seem like, so what?
1220
01:08:09,735 --> 01:08:12,306
So what if the government
can acquire all of this information?
1221
01:08:12,566 --> 01:08:15,051
Maybe it's good they can keep the peace
when riots are happening.
1222
01:08:15,332 --> 01:08:18,300
And besides,
maybe it was already too late.
1223
01:08:26,465 --> 01:08:28,960
(interviewer)
"Do you think privacy is dead?"
1224
01:08:33,979 --> 01:08:37,463
It means it's certainly dying...
whether or not it...
1225
01:08:41,743 --> 01:08:45,579
For privacy to... I mean,
privacy is going to remain dead
1226
01:08:45,649 --> 01:08:50,356
unless there's a fundamental shift
in the dynamic by which our society is,
1227
01:08:50,796 --> 01:08:53,456
by which I mean
the only really effective response
1228
01:08:53,506 --> 01:08:56,490
is to monitor,
and to change the behavior
1229
01:08:57,029 --> 01:09:00,029
of the tendencies
of the intelligence industry,
1230
01:09:00,129 --> 01:09:02,174
and law enforcement and all that,
1231
01:09:02,204 --> 01:09:03,665
and even companies.
1232
01:09:04,215 --> 01:09:06,014
And that's very, very unlikely.
1233
01:09:06,134 --> 01:09:09,228
I don't know exactly who the us is,
but I'm very critical of us.
1234
01:09:10,268 --> 01:09:15,134
I think this is an area in which
we have allowed ourselves to be smitten,
1235
01:09:15,955 --> 01:09:19,081
we want this technology
to grow and grow,
1236
01:09:20,312 --> 01:09:23,210
and we don't want anything
to rain on our parade.
1237
01:09:25,099 --> 01:09:33,787
And we've woken up to the privacy concerns
in my view, at least 4 years too late.
1238
01:09:34,447 --> 01:09:36,836
(interviewer) "I mean,
is really privacy dead?"
1239
01:09:37,055 --> 01:09:38,668
Yes, without question.
1240
01:09:39,258 --> 01:09:41,239
Without question... Yes, it's dead.
1241
01:09:41,669 --> 01:09:44,198
It's safe to work under the assumption
that nothing is private.
1242
01:09:44,298 --> 01:09:47,573
Anything that's been digitized
is not private, and that...
1243
01:09:49,563 --> 01:09:51,030
is terrifying.
1244
01:09:51,291 --> 01:09:53,498
So, when this become
the size of a blood cell,
1245
01:09:53,578 --> 01:09:57,357
then I can just send them into my brain
in my body, through the blood stream...
1246
01:09:57,477 --> 01:09:59,918
this will become quite ubiquitous...
1247
01:10:00,007 --> 01:10:02,756
And it really will be part
of who we are, and people will say,
1248
01:10:02,956 --> 01:10:05,664
well, OK, that's really going
to be a threshold to move beyond...
1249
01:10:05,824 --> 01:10:09,298
But I don't think so,
it's a very smooth continuum from...
1250
01:10:09,978 --> 01:10:12,620
you know, when I was student
and I had to take my bicycle
1251
01:10:12,780 --> 01:10:17,761
to get to the computer, to having it
in my pocket, to having it in my body...
1252
01:10:18,491 --> 01:10:22,081
It's a convenient place to put it,
I won't lose it that way.
1253
01:10:24,622 --> 01:10:27,157
But they say if you put a frog
in a pot of water
1254
01:10:27,207 --> 01:10:29,212
and slowly turn on the heat,
1255
01:10:29,253 --> 01:10:31,991
the frog will just die
because it doesn't realize that it's...
1256
01:10:32,040 --> 01:10:33,096
boiling.
1257
01:10:33,146 --> 01:10:36,816
And I think that's like anything else,
1258
01:10:36,866 --> 01:10:40,058
I think we're opting in
a centimeter at a time,
1259
01:10:41,359 --> 01:10:43,404
and you know, pretty soon
you're pretty far down the road,
1260
01:10:43,444 --> 01:10:46,530
you look behind you, you sort of wonder
how you got where you were.
1261
01:10:48,570 --> 01:10:50,395
I think that's true.
1262
01:10:52,278 --> 01:10:55,098
It's just completely out of control.
1263
01:10:55,208 --> 01:10:59,071
I mean, the sky is the limit, you know.
1264
01:10:59,542 --> 01:11:01,770
They know everything about us now.
1265
01:11:02,693 --> 01:11:05,269
It's like, take someone
who's in charge of laws,
1266
01:11:05,309 --> 01:11:07,091
having what's being done
to American citizens,
1267
01:11:07,131 --> 01:11:09,204
done to their e-mail account,
1268
01:11:09,254 --> 01:11:11,227
- to their Facebook profile--
- Right, so that they pay attention to it.
1269
01:11:11,444 --> 01:11:13,941
All of these powerful institutions,
1270
01:11:15,591 --> 01:11:18,191
they are not subject
to the same invasions of privacy
1271
01:11:18,251 --> 01:11:20,313
as of the rest of us are.
1272
01:11:20,533 --> 01:11:22,183
Eric Schmidt the CEO
of Google once said:
1273
01:11:22,243 --> 01:11:24,960
If you have something that
you don't want anybody to know,
1274
01:11:25,059 --> 01:11:27,325
maybe you shouldn't be doing it
in the first place.
1275
01:11:28,114 --> 01:11:32,404
Then he got very angry
when CNET, which is owned by CBS,
1276
01:11:32,444 --> 01:11:34,546
published a picture of his house.
1277
01:11:42,731 --> 01:11:45,288
When you ask Google about
"Do not track",
1278
01:11:45,329 --> 01:11:48,260
they claim we have to understand
how to define that
1279
01:11:48,300 --> 01:11:50,872
before we can implement any technology.
1280
01:11:51,462 --> 01:11:54,675
"Do not track" is pretty simple,
it means, we don't want to be tracked.
1281
01:11:55,905 --> 01:11:57,985
The only reason Google
doesn't understand it
1282
01:11:58,074 --> 01:12:00,810
is because Google
doesn't want to implement it.
1283
01:12:26,129 --> 01:12:32,369
Unless someone comes
and makes it no longer practical
1284
01:12:32,629 --> 01:12:35,068
for them to engage
in that kind of activity,
1285
01:12:35,479 --> 01:12:39,577
pressure is put upon CEOs of the companies
that are going to engage in it.
1286
01:12:46,296 --> 01:12:48,625
(typing sound)
1287
01:12:53,925 --> 01:12:55,263
It's dawn.
1288
01:12:56,854 --> 01:12:59,317
We're going by
the Facebook campus right now.
1289
01:12:59,378 --> 01:13:01,676
Really, I have no idea
about what to expect.
1290
01:13:02,966 --> 01:13:05,393
We'll now have breakfast.
1291
01:13:06,443 --> 01:13:08,173
[touching screen sound]
1292
01:13:12,658 --> 01:13:14,234
Zuckerberg...
1293
01:13:14,374 --> 01:13:16,999
They know that I checked in here too,
so that's good,
1294
01:13:17,049 --> 01:13:19,314
he knows that I'm right
next to his house.
1295
01:13:20,445 --> 01:13:23,027
See we have... here is
the exact quote from Mark:
1296
01:13:24,177 --> 01:13:27,818
"Having two identities for yourself
is an example of lack of integrity."
1297
01:13:29,127 --> 01:13:31,094
Lack of integrity.
1298
01:13:32,625 --> 01:13:35,223
They just did a knock up on his door so...
1299
01:13:35,349 --> 01:13:39,401
seems very likely that we might get
a Mark Zuckerberg sighting today.
1300
01:13:41,582 --> 01:13:43,950
[clock ticking]
1301
01:13:44,914 --> 01:13:47,895
I mean you might be wrong,
I don't see how it might actually happen.
1302
01:13:48,284 --> 01:13:50,707
Then, they might actually have a tunnel...
1303
01:13:51,816 --> 01:13:55,070
I see definite motion in the yard...
♪ [slow piano music] ♪
1304
01:13:55,472 --> 01:13:57,795
Is it a dog?
1305
01:13:58,457 --> 01:14:00,609
Here we go! [inaudible]
1306
01:14:06,450 --> 01:14:08,234
(tire screeching)
1307
01:14:08,518 --> 01:14:10,059
(interviewer) Mr. Zuckerberg...
1308
01:14:10,129 --> 01:14:13,045
Hey, I'm working on a documentary...
1309
01:14:13,260 --> 01:14:14,776
Doing a little vlog here but...
1310
01:14:14,816 --> 01:14:16,856
wondering if I can ask you
a couple of questions.
1311
01:14:17,071 --> 01:14:20,810
(Zuckerberg) No, I'm sorry,
I have to go to work...
1312
01:14:21,040 --> 01:14:23,937
(interviewer) Just let me ask:
Do you still think privacy is dead?
1313
01:14:24,276 --> 01:14:26,563
And, what are your real thoughts
on privacy?
1314
01:14:27,248 --> 01:14:29,150
(Zuckerberg) Are you guys recording?
1315
01:14:29,304 --> 01:14:31,044
(interviewer) We are.
1316
01:14:31,720 --> 01:14:33,702
(Zuckerberg) Can you please not?
1317
01:14:33,992 --> 01:14:36,683
(interviewer) I can stop, yeah. All right.
1318
01:14:38,183 --> 01:14:41,518
(narrator) Mark Zuckerberg
could ask me to please not record him.
1319
01:14:41,798 --> 01:14:43,985
So, we shut off the main camera.
1320
01:14:44,374 --> 01:14:46,442
But since Mark doesn't seem
to mind storing our data
1321
01:14:46,513 --> 01:14:48,657
after we think it's been deleted,
1322
01:14:48,687 --> 01:14:50,890
this only seemed fair.
1323
01:14:51,449 --> 01:14:53,392
(Zuckerberg) Can you please stop?
1324
01:14:53,543 --> 01:14:56,344
(interviewer) I can stop, yeah. All right.
1325
01:14:56,394 --> 01:14:58,876
Can I come by the front desk
and ask about setting up an interview?
1326
01:14:59,005 --> 01:15:02,745
(Zuckerberg) Yeah. We have a department
that you can talk to people about that
1327
01:15:02,795 --> 01:15:05,420
(interviewer) I've tried going through it
a few times, and I never hear back.
1328
01:15:05,771 --> 01:15:07,731
(narrator) There's a major difference here
1329
01:15:07,781 --> 01:15:09,983
Mark loosens up after he thinks
we'd stopped recording.
1330
01:15:10,573 --> 01:15:13,200
And you see that? That right there...
1331
01:15:13,531 --> 01:15:14,945
That's a smile.
1332
01:15:15,454 --> 01:15:18,208
Mark Zuckerberg smiled at me,
and you know why?
1333
01:15:18,669 --> 01:15:21,524
Because he thought I'd stopped
recording, and he was relieved.
1334
01:15:23,433 --> 01:15:25,063
Imagine what a relief it would be,
1335
01:15:25,123 --> 01:15:28,955
if all these companies and the government
stop recording everything we do,
1336
01:15:29,304 --> 01:15:31,789
if we could just make
a simple request to them,
1337
01:15:31,879 --> 01:15:34,812
something that Mark Zuckerberg
knows how to ask for.
1338
01:15:35,572 --> 01:15:37,578
Can you please not?
1339
01:15:37,648 --> 01:15:40,580
Can you please not record us,
monitor us, and share information,
1340
01:15:40,750 --> 01:15:42,194
unless we ask first.
1341
01:15:43,294 --> 01:15:45,244
We need terms and conditions
that are reasonable,
1342
01:15:45,304 --> 01:15:46,590
and we need privacy policies
1343
01:15:46,630 --> 01:15:49,122
to promote the most basic principles
of our democracy,
1344
01:15:49,392 --> 01:15:51,361
rather than taking them away.
1345
01:15:52,301 --> 01:15:55,835
Or, as a young senator once said,
back before he became President:
1346
01:15:56,154 --> 01:15:59,542
We need to find the way forward
to make sure that we can stop terrorists
1347
01:15:59,653 --> 01:16:03,892
while protecting privacy
and liberty of innocent Americans.
1348
01:16:04,281 --> 01:16:07,424
We have to find a way
to give the President the power he needs
1349
01:16:07,454 --> 01:16:11,410
to protect us, while making sure
that he doesn't abuse that power.
1350
01:16:11,450 --> 01:16:13,714
And that simple principle,
1351
01:16:14,373 --> 01:16:17,646
that there's somebody
watching the watcher
1352
01:16:17,896 --> 01:16:22,736
whether that's on the issue
of freedom of the press,
1353
01:16:22,796 --> 01:16:25,439
or it's an issue of wireless wiretaps,
1354
01:16:25,640 --> 01:16:28,365
that simple principle
is one that we can't give up,
1355
01:16:28,405 --> 01:16:30,020
and we don't have to give up.
1356
01:16:30,711 --> 01:16:33,478
(narrator) Well, Mr. President,
we are watching,
1357
01:16:34,118 --> 01:16:38,646
and I guess we have to ask ourselves
one simple question:
1358
01:16:40,209 --> 01:16:42,030
Do we agree?
1359
01:16:58,571 --> 01:17:01,675
♪ (music) ♪
1360
01:17:35,249 --> 01:17:39,475
Washington is caught
in its very own episode of Spy vs. Spy.
1361
01:17:39,505 --> 01:17:42,598
The tactics once employed by top
intelligence gathering teams like the CIA,
1362
01:17:42,659 --> 01:17:45,953
sifting through IP addresses, e-mails
and fake dropboxes,
1363
01:17:45,993 --> 01:17:49,751
had now been turned against
the intelligence community's top official.
1364
01:17:55,285 --> 01:17:58,064
(anchorman) The FBI uncovered
evidence of an affair
1365
01:17:58,104 --> 01:18:00,836
between Petraeus and his biographer,
Paula Broadwell.
1366
01:18:00,956 --> 01:18:05,277
That's right. Petraeus had an affair
with the author of his falling biography
1367
01:18:05,307 --> 01:18:06,760
"All In".
1368
01:18:12,764 --> 01:18:15,028
These did not implicate
criminal activities,
1369
01:18:15,088 --> 01:18:17,188
these did not implicate
national security,
1370
01:18:17,328 --> 01:18:19,715
these were not a threat
to David Petraeus the person,
1371
01:18:20,014 --> 01:18:24,879
or to General Petraeus, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
1372
01:18:25,568 --> 01:18:28,230
Those are not my words,
those are the FBI's words.
1373
01:18:36,183 --> 01:18:39,367
But instead of actually sending
those e-mails, in many cases,
1374
01:18:39,417 --> 01:18:42,915
they wrote them as drafts
in a Gmail account they both had access to,
1375
01:18:42,965 --> 01:18:45,698
and that way, they can both log on
and check the draft folder,
1376
01:18:45,739 --> 01:18:47,765
never actually having to hit 'Send.'
1377
01:18:48,054 --> 01:18:50,497
It was very embarrassing
for the Obama's administration
1378
01:18:50,547 --> 01:18:52,982
and for its National Security Command.
1379
01:18:59,518 --> 01:19:03,238
It's troubling because there are laws
that the FBI has to follow,
1380
01:19:03,308 --> 01:19:07,456
and he has the right to be protected
from an unwarranted,
1381
01:19:07,516 --> 01:19:09,792
unjustified investigation
by the FBI or anyone.
1382
01:19:09,872 --> 01:19:11,791
People don't really know
how they're being monitored,
1383
01:19:11,831 --> 01:19:13,861
and they think, "Hey, if it's working,
1384
01:19:13,891 --> 01:19:17,216
if we keep stopping another 9/11,
then it's... then it's, quote, worth it."
1385
01:19:40,312 --> 01:19:47,087
The greatest fear that I have
regarding the outcome for America
1386
01:19:47,757 --> 01:19:50,689
of these disclosures
is that nothing will change.